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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, commentators on nonprofit law have lamented the
unsatisfying level of its enforcement.1 These critiques have been leveled
at state attorneys general (also "AGs"), the Internal Revenue Service, and
2
even nonprofits themselves. Yet, today, a new sensibility is emerging.
Enforcers of nonprofit law, particularly state AGs, have developed a
taste for exercising their right to remedy nonprofit wrongs. The new
vigor for patrolling the accountability of nonprofit organizations is not
limited to reactive enforcement through litigation and settlement
negotiation. Rather, activist state AGs also are engaging in more
proactive efforts. The most notable of these are a few AGs' recent efforts
to draft legislation applying financial accountability reforms modeled on
1 See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 657 (1998); James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable
Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 268-69 (2003); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 606-07 (1981); Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the
Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 476-83 (1960). I
myself have mentioned this frequent critique in an earlier work. See Dana Brakman Reiser,
Decision-Makers Without Duties, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 979, 1020-22 (2001).
2 See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 600-15 (describing inadequate enforcement of
nonprofit laws by state attorneys general, the Internal Revenue Service, as well as nonprofit
organizations' patrons); Karst, supra note 1, at 436-60.
[Vol. 38:205
Enron.org
the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act (also "Sarbanes-Oxley" or "the Act")3 to
the nonprofit sector.
AGs' increased interest in their nonprofit enforcement role receives
mixed reviews from commentators. While a change from complete
inaction is certainly welcome, some question how and at whom AGs will
target their increased enforcement activities.5 This Article asserts that
concern over increased attorney general activism should not be limited
to fears of what AGs may do with their new initiative. Those who care
about the nonprofit sector, and who believe in its vitality and importance
to our economy and society, must also analyze the priorities of
enforcement held by state AGs. Due to their political position and the
capacities of their staffs, AGs will fail to monitor vital elements of
nonprofit accountability adequately. Supporters of the nonprofit sector
must recognize these limitations, and must form strategies to
compensate accordingly.
AGs, even activist AGs, first and foremost monitor and police
nonprofits' financial accountability. They seek to protect donors and
nonprofit assets. When activist AGs bring cases to enforce donor intent,'
to return to nonprofits assets pilfered by disloyal fiduciaries, or to
maintain charitable assets within state lines,7 they are engaging in
enforcement of financial accountability. Likewise, the Sarbanes-Oxley
type legislation being proposed by activist AGs strives to improve the
' Congress and President Bush enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to reform financial
reporting and auditing in publicly-held corporations in the aftermath of the series of for-
profit financial scandals that came to light beginning late in 2001. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, pmbl., §§ 7201-7266, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (describing statute as "[an Act to protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant
to the securities laws, and for other purposes"); Statement by President of the United States
George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 3763, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1286 (July 30, 2002)
(describing Act as "adopt[ing] tough new provisions to deter and punish corporate and
accounting fraud and corruption, ensure justice for wrongdoers, and protect the interests of
workers and shareholders").
' See, e.g., Mark Sidel, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the Battle for
American Giving, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1145, 1151 (2003) (asserting that the new state
activism he identifies in nonprofit regulation is "constructive" but also "engenders
substantial doctrinal and political problems").
' See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 939-43 (2004); Sidel, supra note 4, at 1151. See generally Mark
Sidel, The Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1312 (2002)
[hereinafter Sidel, New State Activism].
6 See, e.g., Cmty. Serv. Soc'y v. N.Y. Cmty. Trust, 713 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714-22 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000), affd, 751 N.E.2d 940 (N.Y. 2001).
' See, e.g., Health Midwest v. Kline, No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845 (Kan. Dist. Ct.
Feb. 6, 2003); In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
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financial transparency and financial integrity of nonprofits. State AGs
rightly worry about the misuse or waste of nonprofit assets and their
prioritization of this aspect of enforcement may be appropriate. But
enforcing nonprofits' financial accountability alone is insufficient.
Simply protecting nonprofit assets from theft and charitable
contributions from misdirection is not enough to ensure comprehensive
nonprofit accountability. A healthy nonprofit sector also requires
organizations to function efficiently and adhere to their missions.
Indeed, if they are to remain healthy and continue to make important
contributions to society, nonprofit organizations must maintain high
levels of financial, mission, and organizational accountability. While
AGs have focused on the nonprofit sector's financial accountability,
other serious issues, such as mission creep and organizational integrity,
require oversight as well. Thus, the nonprofit sector must begin to look
for alternative mechanisms to provide this necessary support.
This Article begins with a theoretical examination of the key
components of nonprofit accountability and the reasons why state AGs
do not enforce them uniformly. Part I deconstructs the comprehensive
concept of nonprofit accountability into its constituent parts - financial,
mission, and organizational accountability - and addresses why each is
important to a healthy nonprofit organization and a vibrant nonprofit
sector. Part II evaluates AGs' suitability, competence, and motivation to
address each of these types of accountability. Ultimately, it concludes
that AGs will pursue their nonprofit enforcement agendas with financial
accountability as their principal, if not sole, priority.
The next two Parts detail and analyze recent examples of the upsurge
in AGs' nonprofit enforcement, demonstrating that these efforts have
focused primarily on financial accountability concerns. Part III
canvasses examples of traditional state AG enforcement efforts:
regulation, litigation, and settlement intervention involving nonprofits
and their fiduciaries. This summary reveals AGs' financial emphasis;
they primarily engage in donor and asset protection. To the extent that it
occurs, mission and organizational accountability enforcement is a mere
by-product of AGs' pursuit of financial accountability goals. Then, Part
IV undertakes an extensive evaluation of new nonprofit reform
legislation proposed by state AGs, modeled on Sarbanes-Oxley. These
AG innovations seek to regulate the nonprofit sector more tightly by
enhancing required financial disclosures and mandating changes in
governance, especially the use of auditing committees. In the name of
improving nonprofit accountability, this Sarbanes-Oxley approach also
clearly focuses on financial transparency, with only tangential impact on
[Vol. 38:205
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mission and organizational accountability.
The final portion of the Article offers preliminary thoughts on
complements to AG enforcement. Because even activist state AGs will
not adequately enforce the important prerogatives of mission and
organizational accountability, Part V argues that other mechanisms must
be sought out to do so. Rather than advocating additional governmental
regulation, this Part suggests that nonprofits might self-regulate to
bridge the gap in mission and organizational accountability enforcement.
In particular, it suggests that these goals might be furthered if nonprofits
contracted with one another for such enforcement, if intermediaries
rated nonprofits' relative levels of mission and organizational
accountability, or if individual nonprofit actors could be trained and
empowered to self-regulate along these lines.
In sum, although state AGs currently may be taking a greater interest
in pursuing financial accountability in nonprofit organizations than they
have in the past, they still have not and will not comprehensively police
nonprofit accountability. Mission and organizational accountability will
remain underenforced if policed by AGs alone. This Article identifies
the causes of this sub-optimal enforcement, explores the rich case study
of this phenomenon provided by the New York and other nonprofit
Sarbanes-Oxley proposals, and identifies alternative measures to
compensate for its shortcomings.
I. A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF NONPROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY
Although the aspects of nonprofit accountability may in a real sense be
innumerable, three basic strains cover the lion's share of concerns
addressed to the nonprofit sector in these terms.8 First, nonprofits are
exhorted to be financially accountable: to raise and disburse funds
responsibly and honestly, to keep accurate financial records, and to make
all required disclosures of financial information. Second, nonprofits
' Many commentators have addressed the question of defining nonprofit
accountability. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, in THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA 471, 475-76 (Lester Salamon ed., 2002) [hereinafter Brody,
Accountability and the Public Trust]; Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice and Exit: The
Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 860 (2002);
Fishman, supra note 1, at 219-22, 255-57; Peter Swords, The Form 990 As An Accountability
Tool for 501(c)(3) Nonprofits, 51 TAx LAW. 571, 571-74 (1998). Descriptions of the term differ,
but the themes of concern for financial, mission, and organizational integrity persist. See
Fishman, supra note 1, at 255-56; Swords, supra, at 571-74. Although accountability is, of
course, essential for all kinds of nonprofit organizations, the balance of this Article will
focus on public benefit or charitable nonprofits, and leave aside any special accountability
issues arising in religious nonprofits or mutual benefit nonprofits, such as social clubs.
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must be accountable to their missions. They must act in furtherance of
the nonprofit purposes for which they are formed, which continue to
qualify them for various subsidies and benefits, and for which they
attract support. Third, nonprofits should be accountable as
organizations, governing themselves in accordance with the internal
rules of order they have adopted. This Part reviews these components of
nonprofit accountability,9 setting the stage for Part II's discussion of why
state AGs will not enforce all of them equally well.
A. Financial Accountability
Financial accountability is the most straightforward measure of a
nonprofit's accountability. As in a for-profit business, one can use the
tools of accounting to track a nonprofit's flow of funds and to determine
its bottom line. Many issues form part of the picture of whether a
particular nonprofit has been financially accountable, including whether
it has fulfilled the promises in its solicitations to donors, whether it has
followed specific donor instructions (if they have been articulated),
whether its agents are honest or are using organizational resources for
personal gain, and whether the organization's assets are being
safeguarded for the future use and benefit of its community. These
issues fall into two general subcategories: donor protection and asset
protection.
Donor protection is unquestionably an important goal for nonprofit
organizations. Donors are a significant source of financial support for
many nonprofits.10  Failure to follow through on donors' explicit
demands, or even on their implicit understandings, can spark intense
9 These three subparts of nonprofit accountability may be seen as akin to the strains of
duty applied to nonprofit fiduciaries - duties of loyalty, obedience, and care. To a
significant extent, the concepts overlap. A large part of the meaning of nonprofit
accountability is wrapped up in the need for fiduciaries to meet their obligations. But, this
is not the entirety of accountability. Fiduciary obligation measures the performance of
individuals, and is enforced through legal liability. This Article seeks to track more than
mere fiduciary responsibility; it seeks to unpack a concept of accountability of nonprofit
entities, and of the nonprofit sector as a whole. It also attempts to look at enforcement
through a broader spectrum of means than the imposition of liability on fiduciaries alone.
" See THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC & DESK REFERENCE 54-55 (2002) (showing that
private contributions represented 23.9% of nonprofits' current operating expenditures in
1998 and ranged from approximately 20-33% of these expenditures over past 30 years). Of
course, not all nonprofits obtain substantial financial support from donors, and there is
considerable variation across industries. See id. at 57 (showing differential receipt of
private contributions across range of types of nonprofit organizations, with religious
nonprofits receiving the greatest percentage of all such contributions in 1998 (43.6%) and
international affairs organizations receiving the least (1.2%)).
[Vol. 38:205
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feelings on the part of donors who feel duped." A perception in the
fund-raising community that a particular nonprofit cannot be trusted
can severely damage the organization's fund-raising capabilities,
. . . ... 12
jeopardizing its programs and even its long-term survival. This kind of
loss of confidence in an individual nonprofit may also have spillover
effects, damaging the fund-raising ability of a wider community of
nearby or subject-matter-related nonprofits." Donor protection, or at
least maintaining the appearance of protecting donor expectations, is a
high priority for individual nonprofits and the nonprofit sector at large.'
4
Protecting the assets of a nonprofit from pilfering or misuse is an even
more basic priority for nonprofit organizations. Like any other entity
that has plans and programs to maintain, employees to pay, and
obligations to meet, a nonprofit simply cannot afford to allow its assets
to be secreted away. The need to protect assets, however, may be even
more vital for nonprofits than for profit-seeking enterprises, which
operate with a greater financial cushion. By their nature, nonprofits
cannot raise equity capital,'5 and borrowing can at times be difficult.'6
U See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, A General Counsel's Guide to
Assessing Restricted Gifts, 29 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 27, 27 (noting that "donor
representatives/family members are becoming more sensitive to the use of charitable gifts
in a manner that potentially may be inconsistent with the underlying restriction and/or the
intention of the donor" and are taking action to challenge such uses); Stephanie Strom,
Donors Add Watchdog Role to Relations With Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2003, at A8
(describing recent efforts of donors challenging what they perceive as misuse of their
contributions).
I' See Robert A. Katz, A Pig in A Python: How the Charitable Response to September 11
Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief, 36 ND. L. REV. 251, 319 (2003); Robert Strauss, They're
Mad as Hell, and They're Not Making Donations Anymore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at F17;
Paul C. Light, Fact Sheet on the Continued Crisis in Charitable Confidence 2-4 (Sept. 13,
2004) (reporting results of poll demonstrating that in past three years public confidence in
nonprofits has not rebounded from its significant drop after Sept. 11, 2001 and that public's
most significant lack of confidence is in their ability to "spend money wisely"), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/ight/20040913.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
3 See Henry Goldstein, Opinion, Another Blow for the Public Image of Charities, CHRON.
OF PHILANTHROPY, May 15, 2003, at 41 (noting that "[wihen state regulators get attention
for their crusade on the evening news, proclaiming, that a 'charity telemarketer scams 85
percent of donations,' nonprofit groups of all kinds get a black eye" in an opinion piece by
a fund-raising consultant); Stephanie Strom, Accountability; New Equation for Charities: More
Money, Less Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at Fl.
" See PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT 22, 108-10 (2003). Indeed, nonprofits
spend significant resources cultivating contributors and managing relationships with them.
MICHAEL O'NEILL, NONPROFIT NATION 21 tbl.1.6 (2002) (providing statistics on nonprofit
expenditures).
15 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
16 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 73 (1981); see also Brad Wolverton, New Report
Finds Nonprofit Groups Are Borrowing Less, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 11, 2003, at 27
20041
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17Although many nonprofits earn income by providing goods or services,
they generally rely as well on the earnings or other assets they can retain
and invest."8 Furthermore, the importance of asset protection relates to
concerns of donor protection. Reports that donations have been wasted
or stolen by unfaithful fiduciaries will give donors pause about
contributing to the victim nonprofit and other nonprofits in the same
area or field.' 9 For reasons of programmatic integrity, as well as basic
marketing, nonprofits need to be financially accountable to survive and
flourish.
Thus, it is quite easy to see the importance of financial accountability
to nonprofit organizations. As discussed in Part II below, state AGs tend
to focus on these financial issues as well. However, financial
accountability alone will not suffice to ensure the health of an individual
nonprofit or the nonprofit sector at large. To achieve these goals,
nonprofits also must be loyal to their missions and possess
organizational integrity. The need for mission and organizational
accountability is based on subtler arguments than financial
accountability, but this need is no less powerful.
B. Mission Accountability
Every nonprofit organization is formed to address some perceived
need or goal - its mission. This mission must be stated in the
nonprofit's organic documents: the articles of incorporation and bylaws
in a nonprofit corporation and the trust document in a charitable trust.
20
In order to qualify as a nonprofit corporation or a charitable trust, this
mission is limited to a range of charitable, communal, or at least non-
(describing how economic downturn and hard financial times have discouraged many
nonprofits from seeking credit).
"7 Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing, in To PROFIT OR NOT TO
PROFIT 16-17 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998); see also John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity
and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 525 (2002) (criticizing increased
commerciality of tax-exempt nonprofits).
" Indeed, tax exemption on investment income has been argued to be a type of
subsidy for nonprofit capital formation, because it allows retained earnings to grow larger
and faster. See Hansmann, supra note 16, at 58-62.
" See Brad Wolverton, Fighting Charity Fraud, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 7, 2003,
at 29 ("Charity officials [faced with financial scandals] say they are far more concerned
about how donors will react than they are about the short-term money they lost."); Strauss,
supra note 12, at F17.
1 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(1) (1987) [hereinafter RMNCA]
(requiring nonprofit corporations to state their purposes in their articles of incorporation);
AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 349, 351 (4th ed. 1989).
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pecuniary purposes eligible for these legal designations. 2' When
individuals opt to become affiliated with a nonprofit, as volunteers,
donors, members, staff, or beneficiaries, they expressly or implicitly rely
on this and other statements and indications of its mission.
Of course, nonprofits need not be static entities; to this end,
governance mechanisms are available to conduct the evolution of a
nonprofit mission over time. Within the range of the mission articulated
in its statement of purpose, a nonprofit corporation's directors and
managers may direct its activities in line with the best interests of the
organization. When a change beyond the range of a corporate
nonprofit's articulated purposes is desired, the articles of incorporation
may be amended. Amending the articles usually requires action by the
board and/or members of the nonprofit, if they exist,22 and may
necessitate consent by state actors.23 In a charitable trust, trustees have
discretion in directing the trust's activities within the purposes described
, 4
by the trust's settlor. When a trustee or other interested parties desire
the trust's actions to move away from these stated intentions, a court's
approval may be sought in an action for cy pres. 5 When the direction
and activities of a nonprofit stray from the bounds of its stated mission
without scrutiny by any of these internal or external sources - when
mission creeps, so to speak - a serious failure of accountability occurs.
Whether one judges the nonprofit sector in economic or sociopolitical
terms, protection against unchecked mission transformation is critical.
Economic commentators explain that nonprofits exist as optimal
21 See ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 20, § 368 (describing limitations on purposes of
charitable trusts). The range of permitted purposes varies widely. Compare, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 180, § 4 (1998) (requiring nonprofit corporation to be formed for civic,
educational, charitable, benevolent, religious purpose, or for prosecution of any
antiquarian, historical, literary, or scientific purpose, etc.), with RMNCA, supra note 20,
§ 17.07 (requiring nonprofit corporations to be formed for any public benefit, mutual
benefit, or religious purpose), and with WIS. STAT. § 701.10 (2003) (requiring charitable trusts
to be formed only for relief of poverty, advancement of education, advancement of religion,
promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, or community benefit
purposes).
To be eligible for federal tax exemptions and to receive tax-deductible contributions,
nonprofit organizations also must fall within a spectrum of permissible charitable or
otherwise exemption-worthy missions. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (granting tax-exempt
status to corporations "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific.., literary or educational purposes"); I.R.C. § 170(c) (similar).
= See, e.g., RMNCA, supra note 20, § 10.05.
See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 804 (McKinney 1997) (requiring courts to
bless changes in articles of incorporation).
24 ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 20, §§ 379, 380.
2 Id. § 399.
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producers of certain types of goods and services: those subject to market
failures due to informational asymmetries among producers, consumers
and/or payors, and those subject to government failures of
bureaucracy. 6  The nonprofit sector, under this view, is a valuable
contributor to the economy because it steps in to provide needed goods
and services efficiently, when other categories of producers will not.27 If
a nonprofit's mission is to provide such services, but its activities stray to
produce other items offered efficiently by the for-profit or government
sectors, the economic rationale for the sector weakens.28
Likewise, for those commentators who view the nonprofit sector as a
social or political counterweight," a source of societal pluralism," or a
foundation of civil society,3 the role of the sector is endangered when
nonprofits stray from that mission which their constituencies support.
Nonprofits may be useful to bring together voices that, in a democracy,
would never be heard if speaking alone.32 However, if nonprofits do not
faithfully translate these voices, their adherents, and society in general,
should question their legitimacy and utility. The value of the nonprofit
sector in incubating social innovations or fostering social critique is
likewise weakened if groups fail to operate in service of the goals they
purport to represent. Such challenges to nonprofits' usefulness also
could diminish their popularity, limiting their claim as intermediate
organizations important to civil society. If nonprofits have trouble
finding willing constituents to bring together in order to generate social
capital and learn the skills of citizenship, their contribution to civil
" See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 15, at 843-45 (addressing market failures);
Hansmann, supra note 1, at 504-06 (similar); James Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit
Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 43-44 (Walter W. Powell
ed., 1987) (addressing government failure); Dennis R. Young, Government Failure Theory, in
THE NATURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 190 (. Steven Ott ed., 2001) (similar).
27 See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 506-07; Hansmann, supra note 15, at 844-45.
2' Avner Ben-Ner & Theresa Van Hoomissen, The Governance of Nonprofit Organizations:
Law and Public Policy, 4 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 393, 406 (1994).
' See, e.g., David Horton Smith, The Impact of the Volunteer Sector on Society, in THE
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION: ESSENTIAL READINGS 347-55 (David L. Gies et al., eds., 1990);
Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative
Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 572 (1998).
o See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-17 (George Lawrence
trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
"' See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 899
(2003).
" DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 514 ("But among democratic peoples all the
citizens are independent and weak. They can do hardly anything for themselves, and none
of them is in a position to force his fellows to help him. They would all therefore find
themselves helpless if they did not learn to help each other voluntarily.").
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society wavers.33
Thus, a comprehensive view of nonprofit accountability requires more
from nonprofits than financial integrity alone. Nonprofit organizations
also must abide by their original missions or use legitimate means to
transform those missions over time. When they fail to do so, they
compromise their ability to perform the various societal roles assigned to
them and threaten the legitimacy of the nonprofit sector at large.
Without some presence to monitor and police nonprofits' mission
accountability, the nonprofit sector's situation is precarious. If, as this
Article argues, AGs will not and probably should not enforce mission
accountability, some other policing mechanism must be found.
C. Organizational Accountability
The final aspect of truly comprehensive nonprofit accountability is
organizational accountability. Each of the thousands of autonomous
U.S. nonprofits 4 is impressed with the legal responsibility to govern
itself and conduct its affairs within the construct of its organizational
form. Maintaining organizational accountability is of both independent
and instrumental importance. Legal compliance is independently
significant because it serves the inherent values of order and
predictability, and allows for individual nonprofits and the nonprofit
sector to maintain their claims to autonomy. Legal norms of
organizational accountability also serve instrumental goals, by providing
mechanisms through which nonprofit actors may seek and enforce
financial and mission accountability. For the majority of U.S. nonprofits,
which are organized as corporations, these legal norms are expressed
through nonprofit corporate law."
The legal governance structure of the nonprofit corporation, modeled
on a for-profit corporate template under modern law, is founded on the
creation and maintenance of organic documents and the empowerment
of fiduciaries. A nonprofit corporation is formed upon the filing of
articles of incorporation with an appropriate state official. The articles
Brakman Reiser, supra note 31, at 866-72.
34 THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC & DESK REFERENCE, supra note 10, at 6 (estimating
that number of tax-exempt 501(c)(3) charities in 1998 was 733,790).
35 This Article examines in detail the paths to organizational accountability relevant to
the nonprofit corporation, as it is the primary legal organizational form adopted by
nonprofits in the modem United States. MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES
§ 1.01 (2003). Legal compliance within the other available nonprofit legal forms is
important for this same mix of independent and instrumental reasons.
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5133 (West 2002); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 403
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state the purposes of the nonprofit corToration and provide for its
governance structure in general terms. The primary governance
mechanism is the board of directors, which is empowered to manage the
nonprofit corporation directly or to direct its management through the
supervision of officers and employees.3 These directors may be elected
by a membership defined in the articles or bylaws of the nonprofit, or,
more likely, may be appointed by their predecessor directors.3 9 Directors
then appoint officers and can hire employees or other agents to
undertake the daily operations of the nonprofit, while they retain the
authority and obligation to oversee these other nonprofit actors and to
make major decisions on behalf of the nonprofit corporation. 40
Nonprofit corporate law further instructs directors and officers to
perform their governance roles in line with fiduciary duties of loyalty
41
and care akin to those of for-profit corporate actors. The duty of
loyalty, admonishing nonprofit fiduciaries to avoid conflicts of interest
42
and to further the best interests of their nonprofits rather than their own
personal interests, 43 covers much of the ground addressed above in the
discussion of financial accountability." The directorial obligation to meet
(McKinney 1997); RMNCA, supra note 20, § 2.01-03.
37 The nonprofit corporation's bylaws provide more detailed description of the
governance structures of the nonprofit corporation, its purposes, programs, and various
other topics.
3' Although many nonprofits refer to their board members as trustees, this Article will
use the term "directors," in line with common statutory usage. See, e.g., RMNCA, supra
note 20, § 8.01 (requiring nonprofit corporations to empower board of directors and setting
forth their powers, duties, standards of conduct, etc.).
3 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 31, at 850.
4o See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, § 6(c) (1998); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§ 713 (McKinney 1997); RIVINCA, supra note 20, §§ 8.01, 8.30 cmt. 8.
" For example, a nonprofit director is required to "discharge his or her duties as a
director . . . (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation." RMNCA, supra note 20,
§ 8.30(a); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, § 6C (1998) (applying similar standard).
42 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.0832 (West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:8.31
(2002); RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.31 cmt. 1.
4' See Daniel L. Kurtz & Paula B. Green, Liabilities and Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SIXTEENTH CONFERENCE ON TAX PLANNING FOR THE
CHARITABLE SECTOR § 11.02[2], at 11-12 (1988).
" Various kinds of self-dealing, fraud, the taking of corporate opportunities,
misappropriation of assets, and similar transgressions are all prohibited by the duty of
loyalty imposed on nonprofit directors. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of
Nonprofit Directors and Officers, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 646 (1998). State nonprofit statutes
typically provide procedural validation mechanisms to protect transactions in which
directors have a conflict of interest from later challenges. See MARION FREMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 219-
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one's duty of care, on the other hand, directs nonUrofit fiduciaries to the
process by which they exercise their authority. This duty compels
directors to attend to their responsibilities. They must go to meetings,
obtain information necessary to make decisions allocated to them,
engage experts to provide them with reliable counsel, and document
their activities in the nonprofit's records.46
The legal structure of governance offers nonprofits a framework for
their operations, and a mechanism for legitimately translating the goals
of the individuals, groups, or causes they represent into action.
Whatever one's view of the rationales for the existence of nonprofits, the
sector cannot perform any of the functions attributed to it if its
organizations are shams. Organizational accountability through legal
compliance is of independent value because it structures the
accomplishment of a nonprofit's purposes and provides it with the
attributes of an autonomous entity that can claim various elements of
societal largesse.
Legal norms of organizational accountability also serve instrumental
goals, by providing mechanisms through which nonprofit actors may
seek and enforce financial and mission accountability. Clear records
facilitate the tracking of donations and the use and growth of charitable
assets. Qualified nonprofit directors and officers who attend regular
board and committee meetings have the opportunity to unearth
inappropriate diversions of charitable contributions or misconduct by
their colleagues. Process alone is rarely a complete cure to a problem,47
but the structures and mechanisms that organizational accountability
25 (2004); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 131, 137-39 (1993) (describing pre-validation technique used in RMNCA,
supra note 20).
" See Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses and Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) ("[Dlirectors of charitable corporations are required
to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the performance of their duties, exhibiting
honesty and good faith .... ); RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.30(a)(2); Goldschmid, supra note
44, at 641.
46 Some commentators also view nonprofit directors as bound by a discrete duty of
obedience, to obey the law and the mission of their corporations. See Kurtz & Green, supra
note 43, § 11.02[2], at 11-12; Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for Non-Profit Religious
Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW. 1, 20-21 (2000). Whether a duty of obedience exists as a
separate duty of nonprofit directors, or is merely one component of their duties of loyalty
or care, the concerns it raises have been addressed in the discussion of the need for mission
accountability in nonprofits. See supra Part I.B.
47 Recent for-profit corporate scandals certainly make clear that the mere existence of
records and qualified fiduciaries is not alone a sufficient condition for avoiding financial
misconduct. Still, to have someone qualified and actually attending to the responsibilities
of "minding the store" would seem at least a necessary precursor to financial integrity.
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requires can help increase nonprofits' transparency and educate
fiduciaries about appropriate management and monitoring of their
finances.
Organizational accountability is also closely linked to concerns of
mission. There is no clear, independent metric for evaluating fealty to
nonprofit mission. Without such a metric, individuals concerned with
the mission of a single nonprofit are free to make their own decisions
about its performance and can communicate their assessments with
words or actions. For example, a longtime volunteer in a community
health organization can state her concerns at an event. She might
comment: "Our focus on screening for high blood pressure has become
too narrow; our mission is to promote long-term health in the
community and to do so we need to address health problems with a
greater incidence in younger adults as well." She might try to steer the
nonprofit's activities toward her perception of its mission by starting a
substance abuse awareness program within it or by refusing to volunteer
for its blood pressure screening events. She also could remove herself
from the organization altogether or cease making donations to it. But,
these efforts remain informal and individual.
A governance structure provides a formal mechanism through which
this kind of self-assessment can be undertaken at the organizational
level. As directors and officers make decisions for their nonprofits and
as they supervise employees, the limitations imposed by their
nonprofits' organic documents, as well as their own fiduciary
obligations, should steer them back to consider mission. Organizational
structures also can allow for individuals' assessments of a nonprofit's
continuing compliance with its mission to be communicated to and
considered by those directors and officers capable of adjusting the
nonprofit's course. The deliberative process envisioned by the mandate
of organizational monitoring and/or management by a board provides a
framework in which these actions can occur.
Of course, the legal framework of governance can only spur financial
propriety and mission assessment if it is followed. If officers routinely
engage in self-dealing transactions without seeking approval by
independent directors, the board provides no method for internal
scrutiny of these deals. If directors are merely a high-profile front to
mask capture by an individual donor or by staff members, they offer no
checks and balances against mission creep. For organizational
accountability to serve its instrumental role, it must be enforced;
nonprofit actors must attend to their supervisory and decision-making
roles and make informed decisions in good faith. The mere existence of
[Vol. 38:205
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a nonprofit governance structure and the exhortations of nonprofit
actors' fiduciary obligations may not provide adequate incentives for
them to do so.
Regrettably, AG enforcement of organizational accountability will not
substantially increase these incentives. AGs may appreciate the value of
organizational accountability for nonprofits; however, as Part II will
argue, AGs still will devote relatively little of their attention and
resources to this aspect of nonprofit enforcement. Even newly activist
state AGs prioritize the enforcement of nonprofit financial
accountability. The recent legislative proposals for nonprofit reform
described in Part IV exemplify the limited manner in which AGs address
organizational accountability, namely by attempting enforcement in this
area almost exclusively when it is linked to uncovering or preventing
financial abuse.
II. WHY AGs PRIORITIZE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ENFORCEMENT
Although a comprehensive view of nonprofit accountability includes
financial, mission, and organizational components, state AGs are neither
equipped nor encouraged to enforce all of them with equal intensity.
The combination of AGs' legislative mandates, the institutional
competencies of their offices, and the impact of electoral politics propels
AGs to prioritize financial accountability. Likewise, these forces
combine to marginalize for AGs the importance of mission and
organizational accountability, resulting in relative underenforcement of
these vital components of nonprofit accountability. This Part analyzes
how these forces mold AGs' nonprofit enforcement priorities, to explain
the recent state legislative proposals for nonprofit reform and other
examples of state AG activism explored later.
A. Financial Accountability
In pursuing their nonprofit enforcement responsibilities, state AGs
focus on financial accountability, placing a heavy regulatory focus on
donor and asset protection.4' This focus is predictable for several
48 See, e.g., Office of the Attorney General, State of California, Frequently Asked
Questions, Charities, available at http://caag.state.ca.us/charities/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2004) (describing AG's role in regulating charities as to "represent[] the public beneficiaries
of charities, who cannot sue in their own right [by] .. . investigat[ing] and audit[ing]
charities to detect cases in which directors and trustees have mismanaged, diverted, or
defrauded the charity" and potentially pursuing litigation); Office of the Attorney General,
State of New York, The Regulatory Role of the Attorney General's Charity Bureau (describing
AG's nonprofit regulatory roles as to "supervise ... organizations and individuals that
20041
University of California, Davis [Vol. 38:205
reasons. First, AGs' financial focus can be traced to the terms of their
mandates: to protect consumers and charitable assets within their
jurisdictions. Second, AGs' existing skill sets and tools of enforcement fit
financial accountability enforcement. They historically have tracked
deceptive fund-raising practices and financial frauds, and their power to
regulate and prosecute nonprofits and their fiduciaries is suited to
locating and rectifying financial abuses. Third, and finally, AGs have
powerful incentives to prioritize issues that voters will appreciate and
the media will report. These same factors limit AGs' ability to engage in
the kind of institutional support and policing of mission and
organizational structure that successful nonprofits require.
The law does not charge state AGs with the responsibility or authority
to maintain the health of the state's nonprofit sector writ large. The
mandates issued to AGs to police nonprofit organizations typically
speak in terms of safeguarding charitable assets. 49  The delegation of
power to the AG to supervise a state's nonprofit sector also may address
the need to protect the interests of donors who make charitable
contributions. 5° Even in a new era of AG activism, the resources
allocated for oversight of the nonprofit sector remain tight and so
priorities must be set." One reasonable way for AGs to set these
administer and/or solicit charitable funds or other charitable assets in New York"),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/role.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). See
generally STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 183-94 (Lynne M. Ross
ed., 1990) (describing one of duties of AGs as "represent[ing] the public's interest in the
proper use of funds raised and held by charitable organizations," in introduction to chapter
on AGs' role in nonprofit enforcement).
' See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (West 2004); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12598 (West 2004)
("The primary responsibility for supervising charitable trusts in California ... and for
protection of assets by charitable trusts and public benefit corporations, resides in the
Attorney General."); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-170 (2003) ("The Attorney General may petition
the superior court to enjoin the proposed unlawful conveyance, transfer, or assignment of
assets .... ); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.670 (West 2003) (authorizing attorney general to receive
periodic reports as to all charitable trust assets and to ascertain whether those assets are
properly administered); see also Fishman, supra note 1, at 259-60.
50 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 8 (1998) (instructing attorney general to "enforce
the due application of funds given or appropriated to public charities within the
commonwealth and prevent breaches of trust in the administration thereof").
Alternatively, this responsibility may be a part of the attorney general's comprehensive
consumer protection role. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 48-1204 (Michie 2003) (giving attorney
general under Idaho's Charitable Solicitation Act same powers he has under its Consumer
Protection Act); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5014 (West 1977) (establishing that violation of
Charitable Solicitations Act is violation of Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, under which
AG may prosecute frauds).
11 See HARRIET BOGRAD, THE ROLE OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN RELATION TO
TROUBLED NONPROFITS 8-22 (Program on Nonprofit Organizations, Yale University,
Working Paper No. 206, Aug. 1994), available at http://ponpo.som.yale.edu/work.php (last
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priorities is in reference to the responsibilities with which relevant
statutes obligate them, and to which they will be held accountable.
Furthermore, strictly following the more particularized donor and asset
protection grants of authority is likely to be a safe, if conservative,
approach to applying the AG's discretion.
AGs' focus on financial accountability is also practical; they are
particularly well-suited to pursue this kind of work. AGs are
accustomed to tracking corporate and other financial frauds in their
general consumer protection and criminal capacities, 2 and can bring
these capabilities to bear on investigating nonprofit financial
accountability as well. Nonprofits are required to file financial
information regarding their charitable solicitation activities periodically,
as well as annual asset reports, which provide AGs with the raw data to
analyze. On the donor protection front, AGs can track the statements in
charitable appeals and written gift instruments and compare them with
streams of funding allocated by an individual nonprofit. To enforce
financial accountability in terms of asset protection, scrutiny of the
financial records and reports of nonprofits will again be a concrete first
step. Once abuses have been discovered, AGs are empowered to strip
nonprofits of their fund-raising privileges and to sue nonprofit actors for
visited Oct. 20, 2004); Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's Governance and
Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1184-85 (2001). The
number of staff attorneys available in states' attorney general offices to supervise all
nonprofit organizations varies. Id. As of 1998, New York had fourteen attorneys in its
charities division, Connecticut had four attorneys and Massachusetts had six attorneys in
its charities division. Id. Other states such as Georgia, Hawaii, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, and South Carolina, however, each had only one assistant attorney general to
supervise its entire nonprofit sector. Id. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana,
Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of Columbia did not
have any attorneys specifically charged to supervise nonprofits. Id.; see also FREMONT-
SMITH, supra note 44, at 351-61 (describing staff size of various AGs' charities bureaus over
time).
"' See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 48, at 207-17, 278-90 (describing roles of
AGs as "a leading consumer protection force in the nation" and "as the most visible and
influential state official[s] in the fight against crime").
' Of course, this process will not always be easy. Charitable solicitations frequently
use broad, generic language and following the receipt and disbursement of funds within an
individual nonprofit may require significant accounting acumen. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS,
CHARITY UNDER SIEGE: GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF FUNDRAISING 30-32 (1980)
(describing important responsibilities of accountant serving charitable organization); EARL
WILSON ET AL., ACCOUNTING FOR GOVERNMENTAL AND NONPROFIT ENTITIES 669-71 (12th ed.
2001) (describing fund accounting system available to track gifts' purposes); id. at ch. 14
(describing complexity of nonprofit accounting rules). Tracking the use of explicitly
restricted gifts may be simpler, although interpretation of restrictions can present
challenges, particularly as instructions age.
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breaches of their fiduciary obligations. 54 Of course, the efforts of faithless
fiduciaries to conceal their wrongdoing or a mere absence of good
record-keeping may at times derail the efforts of nonprofit regulators to
enforce financial accountability. But financial accountability has the
virtue of concreteness, or at least concreteness relative to the other forms
of accountability on which AGs might concentrate. Furthermore,
ensuring that charitable donations are honestly solicited and used and
that the coffers of a nonprofit have been adequately secured are projects
at which AGs' current enforcement repertoires may easily be directed.
Moreover, it is practical for AGs to prioritize donor and asset
protection in their nonprofit regulatory efforts because the need for
attention to these issues is clear and pressing. The internal structure of
nonprofit organizations can make the nonprofit arena attractive to
individuals who seek to rob or cheat nonprofits or their donors.
Consider the situation if such an individual should find her way into a
position as an officer or director of a nonprofit corporation, or a trustee
of a charitable trust. Then, she seeks out opportunities to engage in
unfair self-dealing transactions, to extract excessive compensation, or to
misappropriate assets outright. If she does so, only her fellow fiduciaries
and the state AG will have standing to challenge her actions.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.416 (West 2004) (indicating that violations of state's
charitable solicitation regulations constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices, such are
enforceable by state's attorney, including by action to restrict future fundraising activities
by violators); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 44, at 309 (describing broad range of court
actions AG might bring to enforce obligations of nonprofit fiduciaries). It should be noted,
however, that state officials other than the AG, most often the secretary of state, are
sometimes empowered to enforce all or part of a state's charitable solicitation regulations.
See FREMONT-SMrrH, supra, at 317.
" See Atkinson, supra note 1, at 657 (describing traditional charity law's limitation of
standing exclusively to co-fiduciaries and AG); Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in
the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37,40-42 (1993) (similar).
If the nonprofit corporation in question has members, the members may have the
authority to police financial accountability through their access to corporate records, right
to vote for directors (and perhaps vote them out), and standing to sue. However, the
institution of membership cannot realistically be relied upon to increase financial
accountability in nonprofit corporations. Many nonprofit corporations, particularly
charitable ones, have no individual members. And, even in those nonprofit corporations
with individual members, they rarely will possess the informational and practical resources
to perceive and/or challenge fiduciaries' financial misconduct. In those nonprofits with
institutional or corporate members, as is common for nonprofit subsidiaries of nonprofit
parents, membership likewise does not increase the potential for financial accountability,
but merely pushes the problem up the chain to the directors and officers of the parent
nonprofit. I have addressed each of these issues elsewhere. See Brakman Reiser, supra note
1, at 1005-09 (describing accountability issues in nonprofit parent-subsidiary relationships);
Brakman Reiser, supra note 31, at 859-64 (describing limited monitoring and enforcement
capacities of individual members).
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AG enforcement is essential because there are serious limitations on
nonprofit corporate actors' ability to police fiduciary lapses. Directors
have the authority to fire an officer, and they may be able to dismiss a
fellow director, especially one who has engaged in the kind of
misconduct hypothesized above. Directors also have standing to bring
an action charging the officer or director with breaching her fiduciary• 56
duty and to recoup losses incurred by the corporation. But directors
may not be aware of all of the facts necessary to root out misconduct.
Especially in cases of questionable financial judgment that fall short of
blatant theft, directors also may be reticent to challenge the actions of a
fellow director or high-ranking officer, for fear of disrupting the
dynamics of the board.17  Directors also may hesitate to publicize
allegations of this kind of misconduct for fear that it will damage the
nonprofit's reputation, particularly its ability to attract future
donations." Officers may or may not be given access to the courts, but
they face similar impediments to taking action to enforce financial
accountability, along with the additional potential fear of retribution.
Therefore, AG enforcement of financial accountability is critical to
protect donors and assets in nonprofit corporations.
Even in the context of charitable trusts, where fiduciaries are subject to
very strict standards, AGs must engage in significant levels of
enforcement to deter wrongdoing. Charitable trustees face the same
informational and group psychological obstacles to charging a co-trustee
with fiduciary breach as do nonprofit corporate directors. Furthermore,
sole charitable trustees are not uncommon. Without an active AG, even
strict fiduciary standards will have less than the intended deterrent
effect. For example, under a trust law duty of loyalty concept, charitable
trustees must not engage in transactions with their trusts even if such
transactions will benefit the trust.5 9 This is a very high standard,
6 See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and An Agenda for
Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 669-70 (1985).
17 See DeMott, supra note 44, at 141 (remarking that "[n]onprofit boardrooms seem to
be inhospitable venues for challenges to the opinions of fellow directors and the internal
and external experts the directors retain"); c.f. James A. Fanto, Whistleblowing and the
Monitoring Board: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 21-25, on file with author) (arguing that group pressures felt by directors of
for-profit corporations help to explain failures in board monitoring brought to light in
Enron and other recent corporate scandals).
"' See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that nonprofit directors may
hesitate to challenge potential misconduct by co-fiduciaries, for fear of scaring away
donors).
ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 20, § 379. But see Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance:
What's Trust Law Got To Do With It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript
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intended as a forceful deterrent against detrimental self-dealing
transactions.60 However, a faithless trustee likely will be undeterred in
diverting trust assets if she knows enforcement of this rule is
61improbable. Therefore, AG enforcement is also vital to maintaining
financial accountability in charitable trusts.
The staggering press accounts of scandals in nonprofits of all types
and sizes demonstrate that financial abuse in nonprofit entities is not
merely hypothetical. Lapses in financial accountability rocked The
United Way and Adelphi University in the 1990s. 62 More recently, the
collapse of PipeVine, a nonprofit corporation that collected and
processed donations for charities in the San Francisco area, has been
blamed, in part, on its failure to avoid commingling its own operating
funds with charitable contributions to be forwarded to nonprofit clients.
Estimates of losses from this debacle vary, ranging from $1 million to
$2.8 million.63 The former President of Goodwill Industries of Santa
Clara County was indicted on charges of embezzling millions of dollars
worth of in-kind donations and converting them for personal use.6 Even
the tiny Volunteer Fire Department of Scotland, Connecticut has fallen
prey to financial abuses; its former treasurer confessed to embezzling
over $20,000 from the organization to feed a gambling habiti 5 The need
at 7, 19-20, on file with author) (concluding that corporate standards of loyalty and care
have increasingly been applied to fiduciaries of charitable trusts and nonprofit corporations
alike).
I See Fishman, supra note 56, at 677 (arguing viability of such higher trust standard in
nonprofit corporate context); Michael W. Peregrine, Charitable Trust Laws and the Evolving
Nature of the Nonprofit Hospital Corporation, 30 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 11 (1997) (describing
application of charitable trust standard to nonprofit hospitals).
6" See Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence
Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 675-76 (2002) (describing
how strict rules work as deterrents only if there is some belief they will be enforced). See
generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
459-62 (1997) (describing utilitarian calculus of deterrence).
61 See JOHN S. GLASER, THE UNITED WAY SCANDAL: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF WHAT
WENT WRONG AND WHY passim (1994); DeMott, supra note 44, at 133-34 (discussing United
Way scandal as example of self-dealing by nonprofit directors); George Judson, Inquiry
Faults Trustees' Acts at Adelphi U., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at B5 (reporting that trustees of
Adelphi University failed to prevent "extraordinary personal spending" by its president).
3 See Stephanie Strom, Losses Mount After Collapse of Charity Firm, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
2003, at A18.
' See Monte Morin, Goodwill Scam Is Alleged, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at B1; Press
Release, United States Attorney's Office, Northern District of California, Liersch (May 27,
2003), available at http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/htl/2003-05-27_liersch.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
6 See Andre Bowser, Funds Stolen from Charity, THE HARTFORD COURANT, July 12, 2003,
at B3.
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for enforcement of nonprofits' financial accountability is obvious.66
These scandalous examples are linked to the final reason behind AGs'
financial focus; they have strong personal incentives to prioritize
financial accountability issues in their nonprofit regulatory agendas.
State AGs and their staffs are empowered to enforce a variety of state
laws and must use prosecutorial discretion to determine where to direct
their limited resources. This decision-making process is in part
motivated by ideological or policy preferences. Surely, some part of the
process also is influenced by more self-interested concerns - securing
re-election and advancement.67 Most AGs are elected officials" and all of
them must work with state legislatures to obtain resources. Realistically,
AGs' beliefs about the preferences of the voters they represent 9 and the
legislators to whom they must account70 influence their enforcement
priorities.
Once a state AG allocates resources to establish a nonprofit division or
charities bureau, concern over the types of enforcement that appeal to
voters and the legislature impacts his enforcement priorities. Misuse of
nonprofit assets attracts the attention of the media and of potential
voters. Press accounts of nonprofit scandals can be found in newspapers
around the country.71 Dollars returned to charities from criminal or
disloyal fiduciaries are tangible benefits to citizens that an AG can point
6 See Wolverton, supra note 19, at 29; Strom, supra note 13, at F1.
67 Cf. DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13-17 (1974)
(articulating re-election goal of U.S. congressmen); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275,
288 (1988) (similar).
6 See COUNCIL ON STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 53-54 tbl.2.17 (1996-97
ed.) (noting that AGs are popularly elected in 43 out of 50 states); STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL, supra note 48, at 15 (describing attorney general as "the most prevalent
statewide-elected office in state government" other than governor).
69 The traditional problem that nonprofit regulation and enforcement receives too little
attention in busy AGs' offices can be explained in part by this idea. If voters care more that
AGs are tough on crime or effective in obtaining large tort settlements than whether they
effectively police the nonprofit sector, AGs seeking re-election or political advancement
would be foolish to ignore those preferences in making staffing and prosecutorial
decisions.
7 Cf. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309,
350 n.223 (2001) (noting pressure prosecutors face to justify their budgets); George T.
Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REV. 98, 116 (1975) (arguing that
prosecutor's political success depends on justifying his use of public expenditures).
7" A search for "nonprofit! & scandal!" on the LEXIS U.S. Newspaper database
generates 1375 hits in one year alone (Lexis-Nexis, Oct. 2004). See also Marion R. Fremont-
Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of Charities: A Survey of Press
Reports 1995-2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25 (2003). Examples of these scandals are
discussed supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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to in legislative negotiations or on the campaign trail.72  Successful
prosecutions for failures of nonprofit financial accountability provide a
concrete and quantifiable means of demonstrating law enforcement
effectiveness to state legislatures. And, duped contributors today easily
may become thankful voters tomorrow. Thus, to the extent that voters
cast their votes for politicians who provide clear, tangible benefits, 73 a
focus on protecting charitable donors and assets is good electoral
strategy. Indeed, when state AGs tout their accomplishments in the area
of nonprofit regulation, they, too, highlight their successes in donor and
asset protection.74
In sum, the mandates, capabilities and incentives of attorneys general
motivate them to focus their enforcement efforts on nonprofits' lapses of
financial accountability. Unfortunately, as will be shown below, these
same factors discourage AGs from prioritizing enforcement of mission
and organizational accountability.
B. Mission Accountability
Although mission accountability is of great importance to maintaining
healthy nonprofit organizations and the legitimacy of the nonprofit
sector, it is exceedingly difficult to police. In most nonprofits, legal
authority to bring an enforcement action challenging mission creep is
confined to its directors or trustees and the state AG. 7' Directors or
trustees may face real or perceived pressure from their colleagues not to
challenge each other's actions and their position of control within the
organization may make it difficult for them to perceive mission creep
when it occurs. 76 AGs lack of resources and political will may keep them
from enforcing mission accountability. Furthermore, the same issues of
' See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 41 (commenting that in charitable solicitation
regulation, "Isitate AGs know they have found themselves a potent political issue").
' See MAYHEW, supra note 67, at 53-59 (describing how incumbent congressional
representatives seek to provide "particularized benefits" to their constituents, in order to
legitimately claim credit for improving their welfare, in order to secure their votes for re-
election).
" See, e.g., Michigan Department of Attorney General Web Page (noting charitable
giving regulation as one of attorney general's "Key Initiatives"), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,1607,7-164-17334_18095---,00.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2004); Press Release, Office of Pennsylvania Attorney General Jerry Pappert, AG Pappert
Sues Blair County-Based Charity and Operators Over Alleged Illegal Fund-Raising (Feb. 19,
2004), available at http:/ /www.attorneygeneral.gov/press/release.cfm?p=CF02FFOE-F609-
5813-AA8AEAB23E10FD30 (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
' Member standing is often unavailable and standing for the general public is limited
if not barred. See Atkinson, supra note 1, at 672.
76 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 31, at 857-58.
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mandate, practical effectiveness, and political merit that stimulate AG
enforcement of financial accountability will limit AG interest in policing
mission creep.
The state legislative mandates directing AGs to monitor nonprofits
are, at best, an uneasy match with mission accountability imperatives.
Again, these mandates speak in terms of protecting donors from fraud
and abuse in charitable solicitations as well as protecting and
maintaining nonprofit assets. 77 This delegation of authority could be
interpreted broadly to require AGs to monitor and enforce the missions
of nonprofits, but the enforcement tools at AGs' disposal are best suited
for pursuing failures of mission accountability in concert with donor and
asset protection. The AG's monitoring tools - registration materials and
reports focused on financial issues - may offer information on a
nonprofit's activities and programs. The information contained in these
materials, however, mainly addresses whether contributions are used
appropriately and whether assets are adequately safeguarded by the
nonprofit's fiduciaries, rather than on tracking fealty to mission for its
own sake. The legal actions available to AGs - suits alleging violations
of charitable solicitation regulations, charging breaches of fiduciary duty,
or demanding cy pres evaluation of changes in asset use - again focus
on mission primarily in the context of misspent contributions or
misappropriated assets.
These tools also encourage AGs to focus their attention to mission
accountability on two subsets of the nonprofit sector: those nonprofits
engaging in solicitations, particularly those that do so on a large-scale
level, and those nonprofits with assets substantial enough to warrant the
expenditure of an AG's investigative and other resources. For nonprofits
outside of these two categories, mission creep rarely will register on an
AG's radar. Perhaps prioritization of the use of scarce state resources in
this way is responsible and wise. But the mission accountability of
smaller organizations and those with other sources of funding must still
be monitored. Furthermore, even for nonprofits with significant
charitable solicitation programs or substantial assets, shifts in mission
may be extremely difficult for AGs to identify and regulate.
Attorneys general also are not pre-equipped to evaluate shifts in
mission in the way they possess pre-existing capacities in forensic
accounting. The sponginess of tracking mission is entirely the opposite
of the concreteness that characterizes enforcement in the financial area.
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing state legislative mandates
directing AGs to monitor nonprofits).
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Protecting donors from fraud or abuse and safeguarding charitable
assets from theft or misuse can be difficult, but objective methods for
policing financial accountability do exist. In contrast, mission
accountability is highly contextual and often subjective. For each
institution, in addition to reviewing its official statements of purpose, the
contours of its history and development may be important in
interpreting its mission. Even once the bounds of a particular
nonprofit's mission have been delineated, evaluating accountability to
this mission requires consideration of whether and to what extent its
activities and actions serve that mission. Deviations from mission must
be analyzed and a determination must be made as to whether they rise
to the level of failures in mission accountability. Alternatively, they
might be merely de minimis slippage or, perhaps, part of a nonprofit's
legitimate evolution.
Attorneys general could effectively police extreme cases of mission
creep, such as the deplorable gap in mission accountability hypothesized
711by the Massachusetts attorney general in the Hahnemann Hospital case.
This scenario imagined an animal protection society that morphed into a
vivisectionist group.79 Such a blatant abandonment of one mission in
order to embrace the polar opposite of an organization's original ideals
might be easily perceived and policed by AGs. Even brief reports to the
state AG by such a nonprofit would reflect such a massive change in
focus. A reversal of this magnitude also would require court approval to
change the use of any assets involved, and might well prompt a
successful challenge to fiduciaries' actions in approving it under their
duties of care and/or loyalty. However, it is also fairly unrealistic.
Subtler shifts in mission are far more common and more difficult for
AGs to appreciate and evaluate. Consider a group founded with the
stated purpose "to reduce the drop-out rate in low-income
communities," whose activities shift from funding broad-based research
and advocacy to running tutoring and counseling programs.'s Research
' Attorney Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 397 Mass. 820, 836 n.18 (1986). Although this
case raised concerns regarding mission accountability, it was instituted in an attempt to
deal with the related financial accountability issues regarding the use of donated funds.
See id. at 836 n.18.
'0 This discussion puts aside the related financial accountability issues of monitoring
the use of funds donated specifically to address one or the other of these priorities and the
difficult issue of whether funds donated generally to such a nonprofit are misused or
diverted when its activities change. See generally George G. Triantis, Organizations as
Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and
Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1145-61 (2004) (applying capital market
analysis to decisions involving reallocation of charitable assets); Evelyn Brody, The Legal
Framework for Restricted Gifts: The Cy Pres Doctrine and Corporate Charities 10-15 (Nov.
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and advocacy priorities aid in the reduction of drop-out rates by
engaging in the search for more effective educational strategies and by
raising political consciousness of the problem. Tutoring and counseling
programs also serve the goal of reducing drop-out rates, by focusing on
prevention. Does the change in program focus constitute a meaningful
deviation from the nonprofit's mission? This determination cannot be
made by calculation or objective logic alone, and state AGs' offices are
not particularly well-suited to this task.
The political incentives that AGs bring to the task of enforcing
financial accountability also are absent or misaligned in the context of
mission accountability. Shifts in mission do not make for the splashy
news copy that improper use of donated funds or outlandish
embezzlement schemes do. An AG who wants to generate journalistic
interest in order to move voters can make more political hay by
unearthing the misallocation of donated funds than by forcing a
nonprofit to account for its move from general community outreach to a
focus on adult education.
Moreover, for a variety of reasons, rigorous enforcement of mission
accountability by AGs would be quite undesirable. As government
actors, involvement by AGs in defining and policing nonprofit mission
could come dangerously close to interfering with constitutionally
protected rights of free speech and association. The specter of this state
involvement in monitoring nonprofit mission also could chill the
evolution and development of nonprofits' ideological and political
commitments. In addition, as elected officials, there is the additional
concern that state AGs might use mission accountability challenges for
political purposes, even perhaps by targeting groups affiliated with their
opponents. 81
Therefore, even in their new, more active posture, AGs cannot, and
really should not, be relied upon to become vigorous enforcers of
1, 2003) (unpublished manuscript presented at 2003 ARNOVA Conference, on file with
author) (providing detailed analysis of this complex issue). These concerns are obviously
related to mission accountability, in the sense that programs do not happen without funds
and many nonprofits are funded substantially through donations. However, as addressed
above, AGs do have the capacity and motivation to pursue this consumer protection
agenda. The issue in this section is whether mission accountability will be adequately
enforced outside of its overlap with financial accountability concerns.
"' See Sidel, New State Activism, supra note 5, at 1333-35; see also Brody, supra note 5, at
968-70 (arguing that actions of AGs in nonprofit enforcement are influenced by parochial
interest of maintaining nonprofit assets within state borders); cf. NORMAN I. SILBER, A
CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM 5-6 (2001) (describing how judges were able to limit access
to the nonprofit form to groups with missions that coincided with judges' own policy
preferences during an era of mandatory judicial approval of nonprofit incorporation).
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mission accountability. Recent litigation by activist AGs and their
legislative reform efforts drawing on Sarbanes-Oxley exemplify AGs'
lack of attention to matters of mission. And, serious concerns about the
consequences for the vibrancy and autonomy of the nonprofit sector
counsel against encouraging AGs to play a significantly more active role
in enforcing mission. Still, failures of mission accountability threaten the
legitimacy of nonprofits' claims that they provide necessary services, a
voice for aggregating and advocating individuals' policy preferences,
and vehicles to create and maintain civil society. A widespread loss of
this kind of accountability would be treacherous for the future of the
sector and its reputation. Therefore, it ultimately will be necessary to
develop alternative methods for policing mission creep.
C. Organizational Accountability
Attorneys general also fail to police organizational accountability with
the same vigor as financial accountability. The overall mandate of AGs
to uphold and enforce state law should stir them to police nonprofit
organizations' compliance with governance requirements imposed by
their legal form and to enforce the duty of care that binds nonprofit
fiduciaries. The specific grants of authority to AGs regarding the
nonprofit sector, however, do not focus regulators explicitly on
organizational accountability. Rather, they speak in terms of protecting
donors and charitable assets. Failures in organizational accountability -
not holding meetings, not keeping records, an inability on the part of
directors or officers satisfactorily to perform the duties required of them
- may be concrete and simple to identify. Unfortunately, however,
remedying these failures through the traditional AG mechanisms of
litigation and settlement will be quite difficult.
Attorneys general are empowered to litigate lapses of organizational
accountability. They may institute actions against nonprofit directors
under the rubric of the duty of care, to prosecute directors' failures to
pay attention to their responsibilities or, despite attention, for making
poor decisions." Under this duty, a director or group of directors risks
2 Statutes express this general sentiment using one of various constructions. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231 (West 2002) (providing that nonprofit directors owe duties of care
by "acting in the best interest of the corporation and with such care as an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use in similar circumstances"); N.Y. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1997) (stating in some detail directorial duty of care,
including responsibilities to "discharge their duties in good faith and with that degree of
diligence, care, and skill which ordinary prudent men would exercise in similar
circumstances in like positions"); RMNCA, supra note 20, § 8.30 (assigning duties of
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liability and/or having a directorial decision set aside if it is grossly
negligent 3 However, judicial attitudes84 and legal precedents limit the
effectiveness of these litigation remedies."
As in for-profit corporate law, the business judgment rule protects
many decisions of nonprofit corporate directors from substantive
review. 86 This rule provides that when a director makes a decision with
reasonable information, without bad faith, the taint of fraud, conflict of
interest, or illegality, courts will uphold the decision under the duty of
care without regard for the substance of the decision. In both nonprofit
and for-profit contexts, the rule serves to encourage directors to engage
in responsible risk-taking, without the fear of liability.8 However, the
directors to act "in good faith ... with the care of an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position ... and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation").
Of course, in attending to and taking decisions, nonprofit directors need not be
experts in every field. They are permitted to delegate many responsibilities and actions to
committees of the full board and they may rely on internal or external experts, where such
reliance is reasonable. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(b) (West 2002); RMNCA, supra
note 20, § 8.30(b).
"3 See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013, 1015-16 (D.D.C. 1974) (adopting standard of gross
negligence in order to find directors of nonprofit hospital breached duty of care and
finding such negligence had occurred, due to their lack of any attention to their directorial
responsibilities); see also Evelyn Brody, The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (Powell & Steinberg eds., 2d ed.)
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 16-17, on file with author).
See, e.g., George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600, 604-05 (Cal. App.
1954) (adopting standard of nonliability for breaches of duty of care unaccompanied by
breaches of loyalty, in case in which principal donor/director and other volunteer directors
issued promissory notes without necessary permits and grossly mismanaged funds),
overruled in part by Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal.
1964) (holding that trustees, as well as attorney general, may bring action alleging co-
trustee or trustees breached their fiduciary obligations).
s5 See, e.g., Beard v. Achenbach Mem'l Hosp., 170 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir. 1948)
(applying business judgment rule to nonprofit directors).
' See id.; Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 462 (Del. 1991) ("A court cannot second-guess
the wisdom of facially valid decisions made by charitable fiduciaries, any more than it can
question the business judgment of the directors of a for-profit corporation."); see also
Scheuer Family Found., Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 179 A.D.2d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding
nonprofit directors at issue were engaged in self-dealing and therefore were not eligible for
protection of business judgment rule); John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)
(finding business judgment rule applicable to nonprofits, but unavailable to nonprofit
fiduciary at issue due to his gross misconduct); Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz,
The Business Judgment Rule and Other Protections for the Conduct of Not-for-Profit Directors, 33
J. HEALTH L. 455, 459-71 (2000) (providing general exposition of current business judgment
rule doctrine in nonprofit context).
Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 86, at 459-71.
8 See Goldschmid, supra note 44, at 644 (opining that business judgment rule
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rule also tends to minimize the practical impact of the duty of care, save
for directors who are so conflicted or grossly inattentive that they fail to
qualify for its protection. Many states have further confined even this
lax standard by eliminating the liability of nonprofit directors for many
violations of the duty of care, or by permitting nonprofit corporations to
amend their bylaws to do so.8 9 This legal environment makes it difficult
for AGs to attack nonprofit fiduciaries for failures of organizational
accountability through litigation, unless they also have engaged in other
kinds of misconduct.90
AGs also seem unlikely to engage heavily in non-litigation
mechanisms to remedy nonprofits' failures in organizational integrity,
unless doing so also exposes or signals shortcomings in financial
accountability. State AGs are often empowered to investigate nonprofits,
including conducting a review of their books and records, minutes of
board meetings, and other documentation of decisions. These records
should illustrate aspects of a nonprofit's organizational accountability,
such as whether appropriate meetings were held, whether they were
attended, and whether proper consideration was given to organizational
decisions. But if an AG receives a complaint turning solely on failures of
attention or compliance with these organizational formalities, without
accompanying indications of financial fraud or waste, her office is
unlikely to expend its valuable resources mounting an investigation
merely to force an organization to improve its governance prophylaxis.
Without suspicions that a nonprofit's directors, officers, or staff are
making corrupt decisions, or at least seriously inept ones, would a
responsible attorney general allocate his staff to investigate it? AGs
operate in an environment where staff and time are always scarce, and
an investigation based solely on organizational accountability concerns
"encourages rational risk taking and innovation, limits litigation and unfair exposure,
encourages service by quality directors, and limits judicial intrusiveness, [which] applies as
much to nonprofit directors and officers as to their for-profit peers").
"9 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-44 (1996) (immunizing unpaid nonprofit directors
and officers acting in good faith and in scope of their organizational duties from civil
liability for acts or omissions short of willful misconduct or gross negligence); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-58-601(c) (2001) (immunizing paid or unpaid nonprofit directors from suits
arising from conduct of affairs of their organizations, so long as their conduct does not rise
to level of "willful, wanton or gross negligence"); see also Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity
Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1453-55 & nn.247-48 (1998) (describing this trend).
' Brody, supra note 89, at 1441 (noting that AGs rarely prosecute duty of care
violations in the absence of duty of loyalty violations); Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business
Judgment Rule: Should It Protect NonProfit Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 941 (2003)
(similar); see also Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 27 (1999) (describing similar dynamic at work in for-profit derivative suits).
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may well be viewed as a wasteful allocation of limited resources. 91
Attorneys general certainly could adopt preventive measures to
enforce organizational accountability. They might create educational
materials for nonprofit directors, officers, and employees to use to
inform and improve their performance. AG staff members might be
assigned to train nonprofit actors in the nuts and bolts of planning and
running meetings, obtaining and disseminating information needed to
make responsible decisions, and structuring debate to ensure adequate
consideration of issues. Or, AGs might outsource this role to the
veritable army of consultants available to provide education and training
• • 92
to charitable trustees, nonprofit boards and officers, and their staffs.
Although a number of AGs have directed resources to these efforts,
93
AGs and their staffs are attorneys, not educators, and they can be
expected to allocate their resources accordingly.94
9 See Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 479 ("While enjoying
nearly exclusive authority and discretion to challenge the actions of a charity fiduciary,
AGs do not want to take over the business of running charities."); Brody, supra note 5, at
976 (describing role of AG in supervising fiduciaries, while not taking over their duties,
and commenting that attorney general "is not a 'super' member of the board").
'2 See, e.g., Boardsource, Consulting & Training (offering training materials and
consulting services), available at http://boardsource.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2004); Support
Center for NonProfit Management, Customized Training (offering similar training
materials and services), available at http://www.supportcenter.org (last visited Oct. 7,
2004); see also Association Works, Consultants to Nonprofits (offering consulting services to
nonprofits), available at http://www.associationworks.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); The
William J. Copeland Fund, Education and Training (similar), available at
http://www.copelandfund.org/wjcf/copepriv.nsf/et?OpenForm (last visited Oct. 20,
2004).
93 See New York Attorney General's website (advertising "charities symposia" held in
various New York cities to educate nonprofit actors on roles of AG and IRS and on various
topics, including session on accountability and internal controls), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us (last visited Oct. 7, 2004). In addition, state AGs active in
nonprofit enforcement often provide handbooks for nonprofit fiduciaries on their websites
or by request. See, e.g., The Massachusetts Attorney General's website (offering "The
Attorney General's Guide for Board Members of Charitable Organizations," an 8-page
pamphlet providing summary information on range of topics and directing readers to
additional educational materials available from Public Charities Division upon request),
available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/board.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004);
New York Attorney General's website (posting 7-page book with similar summary
information, entitled "Right From the Start: Guidelines for Nonprofit Board Members,"
under Charities heading), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
94 In their role as a state's "chief legal officer," AGs have various powers and
responsibilities in state government. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 48, at 40.
These include: controlling trial and appellate litigation concerning the state, advising state
officers and agencies on legal matters, providing opinions on state law or policy, public
advocacy, criminal law enforcement, law reform, performing investigations, and even
making policy. Id. at 12-14. In some of these functions, AGs have engaged in educational
activities, such as conducting consumer education sessions or community outreach on
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Finally, electoral concerns are unlikely to motivate AGs to concentrate
on organizational accountability. Again, it will be far more difficult to
obtain positive media coverage of training efforts than of corruption-
busting. Efforts to build capacity for legal and effective governance
among nonprofit directors, officers, and staff members are important to
the health of the sector. But, they are unlikely to provide content for
campaign ads or to move exit polls. The benefits of these training efforts,
like the benefits of most educational activities, are long-term and difficult
to quantify and communicate to voters.
All of these factors suggest that state AGs will engage in a relatively
low level of organizational accountability enforcement, especially when
it is not tied to financial accountability concerns.
In sum, AGs will not apportion their nonprofit enforcement efforts
equally among financial, mission, and organizational accountability
matters. Rather, they will prioritize their nonprofit enforcement actions
with reference to various baselines. Whether they opt to concentrate
their efforts where their legislative mandates direct them, where they
have the most appropriate existing skills and enforcement tools, or
where they will receive the most political value for their actions,
financial accountability will be their primary focus. Any efforts toward
enforcing mission and organizational accountability will be salutary, but
are destined to remain of secondary concern. The review of recent AG
nonprofit enforcement efforts provided below, especially, but not
exclusively, the efforts to adapt Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms to apply to
nonprofits, bears out this prediction.
III. ACTIVIST AGs Focus ON FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
In areas as diverse as internet solicitation regulation, donor control
suits, and hospital conversions, AGs around the country are flexing their
enforcement muscles. They also have begun to join together to set
national priorities in nonprofit enforcement. In these examples of
nonprofit enforcement, recently described as evidencing a "new state
topics as diverse as civil rights and farm law. Id. at 181, 197, 207; see also Christopher Petrie,
The Consumer Protection Unit of the Wyoming Attorney General's Office, 24 WYO. LAW. 28, 29
(Dec. 2001) (describing stepped up public education efforts in one AG's consumer
protection bureau); Kevin Simpson, Helping Health Care Consumers, 35 MD. B.J. 22, 25
(Mar./Apr. 2002) (describing AG's use of consumer health care complaints to create
educational materials).
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activism, ' '95 one observes the persistent AG focus on financial
accountability related above.
A. Donor Protection
One major category of nonprofit financial accountability enforcement
by AGs is donor protection. These efforts focus on securing and
enforcing the financial contributions of donors, perceiving these donors
as consumers of nonprofit services whom the AG is empowered to
protect from fraud. Virtually every state has participated to some degree
in this type of financial accountability enforcement, most by instituting
mandatory registration and/or financial reporting regimes for nonprofits
engaged in charitable solicitation.97 In addition, some state AGs use their
' Sidel, New State Activism, supra note 5, at 1313 (coining term and critiquing this
development); Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Key Nonprofit Corporate Law
Developments in 2003, 13 HEALTH L. REP. 1, 5 (Jan. 22, 2004) (concluding that developments
of 2003 "reflect greater interest in the application of nonprofit and charitable trust law
concepts on a variety of public and private levels"); see also Brody, supra note 5, at 942-43
(noting that instances of charity law enforcement seem recently to have accelerated, though
declining to opine on whether they constitute a trend).
See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433,
485 (1996) ("Perhaps because a donor's power is strongest before making a contribution,
state oversight concentrates on the aspect of charities that deals with the public as
donors.").
17 See ALA. CODE § 13A-9-70 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 45.68.010 (Michie 2003); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-28-401 (Michie 2003); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12580-12596 (West 2004); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-16-101 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21A-175 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2595
(2003) (outlawing deceptive solicitation, but not requiring registration); FLA. STAT. § 496.405
(2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-1 (2003); Hi. REV. STAT. § 467B-1 to 13 (2003) (regulating
charitable solicitation, but not mandating registration); IDAHO CODE § 48-1201 to 1206
(2003) (regulating charitable solicitation, but not mandating registration); ILL. COMP. STAT.
§§ 760-55/1, 225-460/1 (2004); IND. CODE § 23-7-8-2 (West 2003) (paid solicitors only); IOWA
CODE § 13C.2 (2000) (professional solicitors only); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1760 (2002); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.650 (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1901-1904 (West 2003);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5001-5016 (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 12, § 8(e) (2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.271 (2004); MINN. STAT. ch. 309 (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-11-
501 (2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.450 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19 (2003); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 45:17A (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-22-1 (Michie 2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW. § 172
(McKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-22-02 (2003); OHIO
REV. CODE. ANN. § 1716.02 (West 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18 § 552 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §
128.610 (2001); 10 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 162.1 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-53.1-2
(2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-10 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-30-3 (2003)
(professional solicitors only); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-501 (2003); TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. §
9023e (West 2004) (telephone solicitors only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-22-1 (2003); VA. CODE
ANN. § 57-48 to 57-69 (Michie 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2477 (2000) (professional
solicitors only); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.09.065 (2003); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-5 (2003);
WIs. ADMIN. CODE R.L. § 5.01-5.08 (2003); see also Brody, supra note 89, at 1405 & n.28
(describing survey of state charity officials who stated their "biggest problem" in nonprofit
enforcement was regulation of charitable solicitations).
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authority over nonprofits to enforce the terms of donated gifts, even
years after the relevant contribution. This subpart describes some of the
more significant of these donor protection efforts in order to provide a
sense of AGs' taste for this kind of nonprofit enforcement.
Over the past several decades, almost every state has enacted
legislation regulating the solicitation of charitable contributions within
its borders.98 The stated goal of these laws is the protection of donors as
consumers, 9 although safeguarding the integrity of the charitable or
nonprofit sector may be described as one of their additional benefits. In
fact, the statutory language and enforcement mechanisms employed are
commonly borrowed from or linked with those of the state's general
consumer protection statutes.100 The choice of regulatory targets also
demonstrates this consumer focus. Typically, these statutes apply to all
entities seeking charitable contributions within the state or from its
citizens, rather than limiting their application to nonprofit organizations
domiciled in the state.10 1 Entities within this wide regulatory purview
typically are required to register with state officials before engaging in
any solicitation activity and to file annual reports and financial
statements with those officials. The laws also authorize AGs or other
" See sources cited supra note 97.
FLA. STAT. ch. 496.402 (2003) ("It is also the intent of the Legislature to protect the
public by requiring full public disclosure of the identity of persons who solicit
contributions from the public."); IDAHO CODE § 48-1201 (Michie 2004) ("It is the intent of
the legislature to safeguard the public against deceit and financial hardship .... ); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 131F-1 (2003) ("It is the intent of the General Assembly to protect the public by
requiring full disclosure by persons who solicit contributions from the public .... ").
Im See, e.g., MODEL ACT CONCERNING THE SOLICITATION OF FUNDS FOR CHARITABLE
PURPOSES § 16(b) (1986) [hereinafter MODEL ACT] ("In deciding whether an act or practice is
unfair or deceptive within the meaning of this subsection, definitions, standards and
interpretations relating thereto under the (state consumer protection act) shall apply."),
available at http://www.nasconet.org/public.php?pubsec=4&sdpid= 21&curdoc=240#16
(last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
0' See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 44-6551, 44-6552 (2002); see also MODEL ACT, supra note
100, §§ 1, 2 (applying to all organizations qualifying as exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). It
should be noted, however, that states vary widely in the exceptions they make from their
charitable solicitation regime. The impact of charitable solicitation regulation may be
blunted when states make broad exceptions to their registration and/or reporting regimes,
as some do by excepting whole groups of entities like religious organizations, educational
institutions or hospitals, or by exempting those entities that receive relatively low levels of
donated funds. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-9 (2001); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-a (1), (2)(a),
(2)(d), (2 )(g) (McKinney 2002).
102 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-6552 (2003); Kansas Charitable Organizations and
Solicitations Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1763 (2002) (requiring charitable organizations to
register prior to soliciting); South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act, S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-56-30, 33-56-60 (2003) (requiring registration and annual financial reporting). In
this kind of ex ante regulation, the creators of charitable solicitation regimes must tread
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state officials to use these materials for investigative purposes, to collect
complaints from contributors, and otherwise to take action to prevent
and punish entities who solicit unfairly or deceptively.'03  Many
charitable solicitation regimes show particular concern about abuse of
donors when professional fund-raisers are employed to solicit
contributions; such regimes include special requirements or additional
penalties for these professionals.
Truly large-scale coordination by state AGs of their nonprofit
oversight roles also has occurred in the charitable solicitation context. In
1997, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) and the
National Association of State Charities Officials (NASCO) brought AGs
and charity regulators together from across the country to develop and
issue a uniform document to ease the process for nonprofits required to
register their intent to solicit charitable contributions in multiple states.'05
Subsequently, NASCO members met in Charleston and agreed to adopt
several principles to clarify the applicability of states' charitable
solicitation regimes to solicitations made through the internet.1 6 The
internet allows charities to spread their message much more widely than
through traditional means and permits them to reach a larger and more
geographically dispersed set of potential donors. State AGs wished to
regulate these types of charitable solicitation, as they regulated
lightly because solicitation by charities is interwoven with highly-protected rights of
persuasive and political speech. Only narrowly-tailored regulation of charitable
solicitation or canvassing is constitutional, and that regulation must be drawn to protect
individuals from crime or undue annoyance with "narrow specificity." Hynes v. Mayor
and Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620-23 (1976).
"I See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.419 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 14.316 (2003). State
charity regulators recently scored a victory in a challenge to their right to protect potential
donors from unfair or deceptive solicitations in individualized, ex post actions. See Illinois
ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003) (upholding AG's
fraud action against individual solicitor).
- See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5008 (West 2003). There are still, of course,
constitutional limits on these ernhanced enforcement efforts. Compare Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of
the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998) (striking down North Carolina's attempt to set scale of
"reasonable" fees for fund-raising professionals and to impose additional disclosure and
licensing requirements on them), with Madigan, 538 U.S. at 624 ("States may maintain fraud
actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive
donors about how their donations will be used.").
15 See The MultiState Filer Project, The Uniform Registration Statement (describing
Uniform Registration Statement (URS)), available at http://www.multistatefiling.org
/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). The URS is currently accepted by thirty six U.S.
jurisdictions, in lieu of their own state-specific registration documents. See id.
'" See National Association of State Charity Officials (NASCO), Charleston Principles
[hereinafter NASCO], available at http:/ /www.nasconet.org/public.php?pubsec=4&curdoc
=10 (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
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contribution-seeking in person, by phone, or by mail. Yet, they faced
jurisdictional obstacles and coordination problems in applying their
charitable solicitation regimes to entities or individuals incorporated or
physically operating outside of their state, but which had a virtual in-
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state presence. In order to regulate internet solicitation more
efficiently, these so-called Charleston Principles define and limit the
circumstances in which a nonprofit solicitor must register with a given
state.1°8 However, state AGs were unwilling to cooperate toward
efficiency in the context of solicitation fraud. The Charleston Principles
boldly claim for each AG the authority to prosecute any entity whose
internet solicitations mislead or defraud persons within his or her state,
regardless of whether the soliciting entity would be required to register
there.19
" See generally Melissa G. Liazos, Comment, Can States Impose Registration Requirements
on Online Charitable Solicitors?, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1379, 1391-95 (2000) (addressing these
issues).
The potential for multi-state enforcement is also of concern to those nonprofits
soliciting through the internet. If merely setting up an organizational website that is
available nationwide would trigger registration and reporting requirements in every U.S.
jurisdiction that imposes them, this would create an insurmountable burden for all but the
largest charities. Filing registration materials and periodic reports could swallow up
substantial human and financial resources. See Renee A. Irvin, Nonprofit Accountability and
State Regulation: Trading a Little Fraud for a Lot of Forms 3-5, Presentation at the Annual
Conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary
Action (Nov. 16, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (collecting and
analyzing reporting requirements across jurisdictions). This burden may be somewhat
reduced by the widespread acceptance of the URS to comply with state charitable
solicitation registration requirements. See supra note 105. However, complying with the
registration and filing requirements of the remaining 14 states who do not accept the URS
and the additional requirements imposed by several states who do accept it still would
require substantial expenditures.
1 See generally Daniel Moore, The Charleston Principles, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY
ON TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 43, 45-50 (2000) (describing development of Principles).
State registration and reporting regimes apply only against entities that: (1) are both
domiciled within the state and make internet solicitations in that state; (2) are domiciled in
that state and have their principal place of business there; (3) are not domiciled there but
whose non-internet activities would require registration in the state; (4) are not domiciled
there but that solicit through an interactive website and either specifically targets persons
in the state or receives contributions from the state on a repeated, ongoing, or substantial
basis through the website; or (5) are not domiciled there but that solicit through a non-
interactive website that either specifically invites further offline activity to complete
contributions or establishes other contacts with the state, such as by sending other
communications promoting its website, and receives contributions from the state on a
repeated, ongoing, or substantial basis through the website. See NASCO, supra note 106.
"0 Constitutional restrictions on personal jurisdiction may prevent AGs from
prosecuting individuals or entities other than those incorporated, doing business, or
otherwise having substantial contacts within their states. See Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes
Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. 1996) (explaining that personal jurisdiction over internet-
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AGs also demonstrate their interest in protecting donors as consumers
by scrutinizing whether, over time, donations have been misapplied.
These cases arise under various circumstances. A charitable trust
established for the "needy in Marin County, California and for other
non-profit, religious or educational purposes in that county" experienced
a tremendous growth in its value and the trustee petitioned a court for
permission to distribute the trust funds more widely."' The California
AG opposed the petition and the case ultimately settled with the donor's
geographical restriction essentially intact." In a recent New York case,
the AG intervened to seek limitations on the variance power of
community foundations, which allows them to apply donated funds for
purposes beyond those anticipated by their donors, in response to
changing community needs. And, following revelations that the Red
Cross planned to use some funds donated in the aftermath of the
September 11th terrorist attacks for purposes beyond compensating the
victims of those attacks, New York's AG threatened legal action to
challenge a misuse of donated funds' Had informal pressures and
regulatory changes by the Internal Revenue Service not prompted the
Red Cross to change its plans, other AGs likely would have joined in
such litigation on behalf of their citizen donors.
soliciting entity required directed action oriented toward forum state, and finding this
requirement met by coordinated newspaper and internet campaign). But see Christian
Science Bd. v. Robinson, 123 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (stating that "the
solicitation of funds over a web site constitutes the transaction of business within the
forum" and citing Heroes, Inc., supra, for this authority). However the constitutional issues
are ultimately resolved, the Charleston Principles make clear that AGs will not quietly
relinquish their consumer protection role in cyberspace.
10 Estate of Buck, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 443-44 (Ct. App. 1994) (describing original
litigation in later, unsuccessful collateral attack on its settlement); Estate of Buck, No. 23259
(Super. Ct. Marin County 1986), reprinted in Symposium: Nonprofit Organizations, 21 U.S.F.
L. REV. 691, 693 (1987).
'11 Estate of Buck, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-45 (describing, in subsequent litigation,
attorney general's involvement in settlements reached in original case); Estate of Buck, No.
23259, reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L. REV. at 699, 708-09; see also Ronald Hayes Malone et al., The
Buck Trust Trial -A Litigator's Perspective, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 585 (1987); Douglas J. Maloney,
The Aftermath, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 681 (1987); John G. Simon, American Philanthropy and the
Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 641 (1987).
... Cmty. Serv. Soc'y v. N.Y. Cmty. Trust, 713 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), affd,
751 N.E.2d 940 (N.Y. 2001); see also Sidel, supra note 4, at 1148; Sidel, New State Activism,
supra note 5, at 1324-31 (describing New York Community Trust and other cases where
New York AG's office has become involved in enforcing donor restrictions).
"1 For a comprehensive review of the strengths and weaknesses of this claim, see Katz,
supra note 12, at 316-19. The article provides an in-depth discussion of the legal
predicament of disaster relief organizations following September 11, 2001.
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AGs' donor protection activity, through ex ante registration and
disclosure requirements for charitable solicitation, as well as ex post
litigation on fraud or misallocation theories, is real and may well be
growing. This donor protection imperative is a vivid example of AGs'
preoccupation with financial accountability. Of course, concerns about
diversion of donated funds also raise mission accountability questions.
However, it is the possibility of financial missteps, and misuse of
donated funds in particular, that appears to bring cases of mission creep
into sufficiently sharp relief for nonprofit regulators to take notice. AGs'
enforcement efforts regarding asset protection reveal a similar pattern.
B. Asset Protection
When state AGs sue to protect nonprofit and charitable assets from
theft or loss, they once again engage in the financial accountability
component of nonprofit enforcement. Most obviously, AGs have sued
114
nonprofit fiduciaries for breaches of the duty of loyalty. In their efforts
to root out and counter nonprofit scandals, AGs have sought to recoup
from nonprofit directors or trustees the funds these fiduciaries have
embezzled"' or received improperly through sweet self-dealing
transactions 6 or excessive compensation arrangements."7 These actions
remain a primary concern of nonprofit regulators.""
AGs' concern over asset protection also can be seen in their
involvement in contests over the conversion of nonprofit health care
114 See generally Brody, supra note 89, at 1440-41 (chronicling several of these challenges).
"' See, e.g., Brad Wolverton, Study: Charity Fraud Exceeds $1 Billion, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 27, 2003, at 26; Strom, supra note 13, at F1.
... See, e.g., Richard Perez-Pena, Ex-Port Authority Head Settles Conflict-of-Interest Suit
Over Role With Hospital, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at B5; Bernard Stamler, The Gray Area For
Nonprofits, Where Legal is Questionable, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at F1; Stephanie Strom,
Battle in Omaha Charitable Group Reflects Issues Raised in Corporate Scandals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2004, at A13.
,' See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, New Rules Lift the Lid on Nonprofit Pay, N.Y. TMES, Nov.
17, 1999, at H2; Brad Wolverton, What Went Wrong?, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 4,
2003, passim.
"' See, e.g., California Office of the Attorney General, Guide for Charities, at 39
(describing AG's role to "investigate[] and audit[] charities to detect cases in which
directors and trustees have mismanaged, diverted, or defrauded the charity" and
to recover any charitable assets lost as result), available at http://www.caag.state.ca.us
/charities/publications/gfc.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); Office of the New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Charities Bureau (stating that AG's Charities Bureau "is
responsible for supervising charitable organizations to ensure donors and beneficiaries...
are protected from unscrupulous practices in the solicitation and management of charitable
assets"), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
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providers into for-profit businesses."9  Attorneys general insert
themselves into these transactions by diverse methods and at various
points in the conversion process."' Sometimes, general state nonprofit
corporate law requires the AG to approve a sale or dissolution
necessitated by a conversion transaction, providing the AG with
negotiating power in the transaction or the opportunity to initiate
litigation.' In addition, at the height of the conversion movement of the
mid- to late-1990s, AGs also became involved in drafting and enforcing
special statutes regulating the process of nonprofit hospital conversion.
These statutes often impose formal involvement by AGs and/or other
state officials in order to finalize a conversion transaction, and frequently
require nonprofits to report financial aspects of such deals."' However
AGs' roles are framed, their attention typically targets two types of
financial issues: (1) the fairness of the value received by the nonprofit
124
entity in a sale or exchange of assets with the for-profit entity, and (2)
the appropriateness of the non rofit's plans for maintaining funds
dedicated to charitable purposes.
Finally, the recent battle between the attorney general of Pennsylvania
and the Milton Hershey School Trust ("the Trust") colorfully
demonstrates the extremes to which AGs will go in the name of
protecting charitable assets.26 Hershey Foods Corporation founder
119 See Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal Response to
Hospitals' Changes in Charitable Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 236 (1997).
,20 See David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory Follies, 23 J.
CORP. L. 741, 765 (1998).
121 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §§ 5-22 (2d ed. 2000).
'" See Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors'
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Nonshareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 409, 424-25 (2002); Hyman, supra note 120, at 766.
"2 Common points on which the attorney general must be informed or must approve
include the price set for the transaction, the entity to which charitable assets will be
transferred, and future financial relationships between any such nonprofit entities and the
for-profit hospital. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 194-C (West 2003); see also FURROW
ET AL., supra note 121, §§ 5-22.
12 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 121, §§ 5-22; Richard C. Allen, The Massachusetts
Experience, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 85, 87.
12 Hyman, supra note 120, at 764 ("The most common complaint about conversion is
that the trustees were snookered, and the for-profit entity bought a valuable asset for
pennies on the dollar .... ); Singer, supra note 119, at 223.
126 See, e.g., Neil Buckley, Hershey Kisses Goodbye to Dollars $17m, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2002, at 18; Stephanie Strom, Strong Arm-Shaking of Charities Raises Ethics Qualms, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2003, at 22. Legal academics also have begun to comment on the Hershey
case; one can find excellent descriptions of the details of the case in Brody, supra note 5, and
Mark Sidel, The Struggle for Hershey: Community Accountability and the Law in Modern
American Philanthropy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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Milton S. Hershey and his wife endowed the Trust principally to benefit
a local school to be established for orphans. For over eighty years, the
corpus of the Trust consisted largely of shares in Hershey Foods. 8 The
dispute between the AG and the Trust began when the Trust announced
its intention to explore a sale of its Hershey Foods shares in order to
diversify the Trust's investments.9 Such a sale would offer the buyer a
controlling interest in Hershey Foods. The community immediately
became concerned that a sale to an outside party would threaten the
employment opportunities and stability of the Hershey, Pennsylvania
community.1 3 The Pennsylvania attorney general filed an action seeking
an order that the Trust show cause why such a sale should not be subject
to court approval, and obtained an injunction preventing the Trust from
selling or committing to sell its interest without such approval.
1 3 1
Ultimately, the Trust changed course and abandoned its plans to sell its
Hershey Foods stock.132
Interestingly, in this case, an AG sought not only to protect the assets
of the nonprofit entity involved, but also to maintain within his state the
jobs and revenue that the Trust's controlling interest in Hershey Foods
represented.3  In fact, these two roles could be seen as conflicting.
Typically, diversification is a laudable goal for charitable trustees, in that
it reduces the risk to the assets dedicated to the trust's charitable
mission.' This case is unusual in that the Pennsylvania AG challenged
the trustees' attempts to diversify in order to pursue another possibly
laudable and surely electorally-valuable goal - protecting jobs and
revenues for his state. Nevertheless, the focus again was on asset
protection rather than on evaluating the operations or programmatic
functions of the Trust.
127 See In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 328 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
128 See id. at 329.
129 See id. at 328; see also Court Gets Taste Of Hershey Sale Battle, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27, 2002,
at A51. This was not the first time the Trust had tangled with the attorney general. In 1999,
the Pennsylvania courts refused a cy pres application by the Trust, requesting permission to
apply some of its funds to establish a teacher training center. See In re Milton Hershey Sch.
Trust, 807 A.2d at 329. The Pennsylvania AG contested the petition. See id. at 329-30. His
position was ultimately victorious. See id. at 332-35.
" See In re Milton Hershey Sch: Trust, 807 A.2d at 328; see also Sidel, supra note 126, at 14-
16.
131 See In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 325.
132 See David Lamb, Bitterness Taints a Sweet Victory, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at 12.
3 See Brody, supra note 5, at 992; Sidel, supra note 126, at 20-24.
1", See Brody, supra note 5, at 998-99; Sidel, supra note 126, at 33-34.
135 UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 (1994); SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 20, § 389.
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Building from these activist efforts, three state AGs have begun to
propose legislation adapting portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to
regulate nonprofits. As Part IV shows, these proposed reforms again
reveal AGs' almost exclusive interest in the financial aspects of nonprofit
accountability.
IV. SARBANES-OXLEY: THE LATEST AG Focus ON FINANCIAL CONCERNS
AGs' recent pursuit of nonprofit legislation drawing on Sarbanes-
Oxley is the latest example of their tendency to focus their renewed vigor
for enforcement on financial accountability. In part, this focus is an
unavoidable consequence of AGs' decision to use portions of the Act as a
model for nonprofit regulation. Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley in
reaction to the now familiar spate of for-profit corporate scandals
involving misleading financial reporting and destruction of financial
documentation. 3 6  The Act directly addresses these specific and high-
profile financial abuses and implements a series of general reforms
intended to improve the transparency and accuracy of financial
reporting by publicly-traded companies. 8 Thus, financial accountability
is the chief concern of the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act.139
11 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); William C. Powers, Jr. et al.,
Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron
Corp. (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport
/cover.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
7 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 401(j) (instructing SEC to issue regulations requiring
disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions in annual and quarterly reports of registered
companies); id. § 1102 (enhancing criminal penalties for destruction of documents).
13 See id., pmbl. (describing statute as "[aln Act to protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and
for other purposes.").
'3' The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley required the promulgation of new rules under the
Act by the SEC, and was accompanied by the development of new listing standards by
stock exchanges and the recommendation of best practices by business industry groups.
See, e.g., SEC, SEC Final Rule (listing final rules recently promulgated by the SEC, many of
which are pursuant to mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2004); NYSE, Report of the New
York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee (June 6, 2002),
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp__govreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2004);
The Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance (May 2002), available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). This Article
will concentrate on the reforms implemented under Sarbanes-Oxley, as the most prominent
example of financial accountability reform imposed after the corporate scandals of 2001
and 2002, and the one taken up by nonprofit regulators who have expressed interest in the
subject.
Commentators differ on the extent to which Sarbanes-Oxley has altered the
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Sarbanes-Oxley does not, by its terms, address the nonprofit sector.
140
However, soon after its enactment, the question arose whether similar
reforms would be applied to the nonprofit sector. 14 1  Purveyors of
continuing legal education quickly began offering lectures and courses
on Sarbanes-Oxley, specifically targeting counsel for nonprofit
organizations. 142 Commentators, as well as the sponsors of these courses,
landscape of corporate governance and financial disclosure for public companies. Compare
Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 381 (2003) (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as "a constructive step
in the right direction"), and Jonathan R. Macey, The Future Disclosure System: A Pox on Both
Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of
Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. L. Q. 329, 355 (2003) (concluding that although it
is not a cure for all of the ills in the American capital markets, "Sarbanes-Oxley was a
measured and appropriate response to the abject failures in U.S. corporate governance
typified by Enron."), with Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 915 (2003) (describing Act as merely incremental, though potentially positive, reform),
and Perino, supra note 61, at 673 (criticizing Act's criminal provisions in particular as mere
"political grandstanding"). However, it cannot be disputed that this legislation, along with
the efforts of self-regulatory and trade organizations, has focused attention on improving
the financial accountability of publicly-traded companies.
"0 A few of the Act's more general provisions, such as its heightening of penalties for
obstruction of justice, would apply to nonprofits in certain circumstances. However, the
vast majority of the Act's provisions apply to the SEC itself, to issuers of securities that
register with the SEC, and to the attorneys, accountants, and other financial professionals
who service those issuers. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78(m)(3) (2002)) (applying new audit committee independence requirements to "issuers");
id. § 307 (directing SEC to implement additional professional responsibility requirements
for attorneys); id. § 203 (requiring accounting firms to rotate audit partners). Nonprofit
organizations are prohibited from distributing their net earnings to outsiders. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5410, 5049 (West 2002) (prohibiting such distributions to members);
RMNCA, supra note 20, §§ 13.01, 1.40 (prohibiting payments from nonprofit corporations to
their "members, directors, or officers"); see also Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of
Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 28 (Walter W.
Powell ed., 1987) (describing nondistribution constraint more generally). By operation of
this so-called "nondistribution constraint," nonprofits are precluded from issuing equity
securities. Thus, they generally will not come within the purview of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act itself.
141 Of course, one may seriously question whether measures modeled on the federal
Act will be effective tools to improve nonprofits' financial accountability. These concerns
are important, but are beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of them, see Dana
Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals
for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2005); Wendy K. Szymanski, An
Allegory of Good (and Bad) Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit
Organizations, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1315-28 (2003). The balance of this Article leaves
aside the issue of whether nonprofit reforms modeled on Sarbanes-Oxley will have the
impact their proponents expect, and reviews the content of these efforts instead, to
demonstrate that it is indeed financial accountability that these reforms target.
1" See Univ. of Washington School of Law, Symposium, New Developments Affecting
Nonprofit and Tax-Exempt Organizations, available at http: / /www.uwcle.org/nonprofit
2003.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004); The Alliance for Nonprofit Governance, Changing
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asserted that Sarbanes-Oxley changed the landscape of business
regulation and that its changes would seep into regulation of the
nonprofit sector through changing norms and possibly new state-level
legislation with wider application. They were right. At NASCO's 2003
annual meeting, charities regulators discussed the potential application
of Sarbanes-Oxley type reforms to nonprofit institutions. T4 Various state
AGs have expressed an interest in applying these types of reforms to the
nonprofit sector, and three have produced legislative proposals.
Nonprofit Accountability (on file with author); A.B.A. Business Law Section, Protecting
Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, available at http: / /www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporate
responsibility/clearinghouse/03spring/24/protectingdirectors.pdf (last visited Oct. 11,
2004); see also Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Taking the Prudent Path: Best
Practices for Not-for-Profit Boards, TRUSTEE, Nov./ Dec. 2003, at 24-27 (offering two nonprofit
legal experts' ideas on nonprofit best practices after Sarbanes-Oxley).
... See, e.g., Blum Shapiro, Implications of Sarbanes Oxley Act on Non-Profit Organizations,
THE COMPETITIVE EDGE, Spring 2003 (advising nonprofits to consider reforms like those
required of public companies under Sarbanes-Oxley, although Act would not, by its terms,
apply to them); Thomas Silk, Ten Emerging Principles of Governance of Nonprofit Corporations,
43 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 35 (2004) (describing ways in which Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms
have impacted, and will continue to impact, nonprofit governance, even if state legislative
proposals are not ultimately enacted); The Nonprofit Coordinating Committee of New
York (NPCC), Accountability Issues, NPCC NEWSL., Jan., 1, 2003 (on file with author)
(advising members of this nonprofit trade association to be aware of potential impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on nonprofits, through shifts in business culture or new regulation); ABA
Coordinating Committee on Nonprofit Governance, Guide to Current and Emerging
Standards of Nonprofit Corporate Governance: Governing and Best Practices in the Wake of
Sarbanes-Oxley, Jan. 2004 (unpublished draft on file with author); BoardSource &
Independent Sector, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Implications for Nonprofit Organizations,
available at http://www.independentsector.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
"4 See National Association of State Charity Officials (NASCO), National Meeting
Agenda, Sept. 15, 2003 (on file with author). Accountability concerns of state regulators
were also a major focus of the 2003 Annual Meeting of Independent Sector, a national
coalition of nonprofit organizations of various kinds. See Stephen G. Greene, Philanthropy's
Challenges, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 13, 2003, at 27.
"' See Memorandum of Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly,
Summary of Draft 1.0, An Act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public Charities
(unpublished summary on file with author) [hereinafter Mass. Summary] (describing
efforts of Massachusetts AG to draft bill increasing financial oversight of nonprofits,
modeled on Sarbanes-Oxley Act), available at http:/ /www.providers.org/Charities%20Fin
%20Legis%2OSummary%20%2704.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004); Press Release, California
Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Lockyer Unveils Reforms to Toughen Nonprofit
Accountability: Fundraiser Controls, Audit, Disclosure and Compensation Provisions Seek to
Protect Charities and Donors (Feb. 12, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cal. AG Press
Release] (describing AG's reform proposal and its imminent introduction by state Senator
Sher); Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer
Proposes Reforms of State Corporate Accountability Laws (Jan. 23, 2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter N.Y. AG Press Release]; see also Patrice A. Heinz, Responding to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: The Financial Reporting Practices of Nonprofits 9 (2003) (published by The
Alliance for Children and Families, Milwaukee, WI) (mentioning interest of AGs in Ohio
and Minnesota in pursuing such legislation as well); Stephanie Strom, Questions About Some
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New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer took the lead on this issue in
early 2003,146 when he recommended to his state legislature a proposal to
apply reforms modeled on Sarbanes-Oxley provisions to nonprofit
organizations. 147 He stated that the proposal would protect consumers
from fraud perpetrated by "not-for-profit entities that have custody of
billions of dollars in charitable funds" by "strengthen[ing] state laws to
protect [] donors." 148 The AG's proposal was drafted into a bill that, if
enacted, would amend various sections of New York's Not-For-Profit
Corporation Law. The bill was introduced in the New York State
Senate in April 2003, amended two months later, and it remains inS 151
committee. In March 2004, a companion bill was introduced and
referred to committee in the New York State Assembly.52  The
Massachusetts Attorney General, Tom Reilly, has drafted a comparable
bill to apply to public charities in that state, though it has yet to be
introduced in the legislature. In February 2004, a similar bill was
Charities' Activities Lead to a Push for Tighter Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at 23
(describing efforts of New York, Massachusetts, and California AGs to propose new
nonprofit accountability legislation, and noting comments by Senator Charles Grassley,
chairman of U.S. Senate Finance Committee, that his committee also planned to study
issue).
11 Attorney General Spitzer has been at the forefront in various areas of post-Enron
reform, so it is not surprising to find him spearheading the movement to adapt Sarbanes-
Oxley to the nonprofit context. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 456, 457-58 (2003) (noting that AG Spitzer has been the main state regulator active
in post-Enron corporate governance reform); John Cassidy, How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall
Street, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 54; 60 Minutes: The Sheriff of Wall Street (CBS
television broadcast, May 25, 2003) (profiling AG Spitzer's aggressive pursuit of Wall Street
following Enron and other corporate scandals).
147 See N.Y. AG Press Release, supra note 145, at 1.
14I Id.
As a series of amendments to the state's nonprofit corporation law, the proposed bill
will have little if any impact on those nonprofits organized as charitable trusts and
unincorporated associations.
" At the request of the attorney general, the bill was introduced in the state Senate by
Senator Leibell on Apr. 23, 2003, where it was referred to the Committee on Corporations,
Authorities and Commissions. See S.B 4836, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); see also
Szymanski, supra note 141, at 1304-06 (analyzing provisions of AG's bill as originally
introduced).
151 The bill was amended in various respects and referred back to the committee on
June 10, 2003; it was reassigned there at the opening of the new Senate session on Jan. 7,
2004. See S.B. 4836-A, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). Its most recent amendment changed
only its effective date. See S.B. 4836-B, 227th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2004).
1"2 See A.B. 10239, 227th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2004). The Assembly bill precisely replicates
the Senate bill. For brevity, future references to the New York bill will cite to the current
Senate version, N.Y. S.B. 4836-B, only.
'" Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, An Act to Promote the
Financial Integrity of Public Charities: Draft 1.0 (unpublished draft legislation on
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introduced in the California state Senate on behalf of its Attorney
General, Bill Lockyer."' The bill was amended several times and was
passed by both houses of the California legislature; the governor signed
it into law in September 2004, but warned that the legislature should
revisit these issues if the new regulation proved to be overly
burdensome. 5 It remains to be seen whether California will revise its
legislation or the other states' proposals will be enacted in their current
form, if at all. Still, the content of these proposals offers valuable insight
into AGs' nonprofit enforcement priorities, including their tendency to
emphasize financial accountability.
file with author) [hereinafter Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0], available at http://www.providers.org
/Charities/ 20Fin%20Integrity/ 2OLegis%20Jan%2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
" The Nonprofit Integrity Act, S.B. 1262, 2003-2004 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2004)
(version introduced in California Senate on Feb. 13, 2004), available at
ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_1251-300/sb_1 262 -bill 20040213_introduced.
pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); see also Cal. AG Press Release, supra note 145, at 1 (describing
AG's reform proposal and its imminent introduction by state Senator Sher). The California
bill was more limited than the New York and Massachusetts bills in its application of
disclosure and governance reforms to nonprofits, but the California bill also included
significant reforms related to the state's charitable solicitation regime.
155 See The Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919 (as signed by governor Sept.
29, 2004), available at http:/ / www.leginfo.ca.gov /pub /bill/ sen / sb_1251-1300 / sb_1262
bill_20040930_chaptered.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); Grant Williams, Calif. Passes New
Law on Charity Accountability, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 14, 2004, at 32 [hereinafter
Williams, Calif. Passes New Law] (describing the law's passage and the governor's message);
see also Grant Williams, California Legislature Approves Measure Opposed by Many of the State's
Charities, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 15, 2004 (describing measure's passage in the
legislature and several groups' efforts to persuade governor to veto it).
" In June 2004, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on charity oversight
and reform. See Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things From Happening to Good
Charities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004) (written materials
and streaming video available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing62204.htm
(last visited Oct. 11, 2004)). In connection with the hearing, the Committee released a
bipartisan staff discussion draft proposing, by one estimate, over 200 potential reforms
addressed to nonprofit organizations and to be implemented primarily through
amendments to the federal tax code. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 108TH
CONG., STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT (2004) [hereinafter SFC White Paper], available at
http:/ /finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf (last visited Oct.
7, 2004); Brad Wolverton, Rethinking Charity Rules, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, July 22, 2004,
passim.
In September 2004, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles Grassley and
Ranking Member Max Baucus asked Independent Sector to convene a panel to review and
make recommendations on the discussion draft's proposals. See Letter from U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance to Diana Aviv (Sept. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/SFCltr.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
Independent Sector agreed to do so, named a panel and plans to make final
recommendations in the spring of 2005. See Independent Sector (IS), IS Response to Senate
Finance Committee, available at http://www.independentsector.org/panel/response.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
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The federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains a long list of reforms, at least
two categories of which are ripe for imitation by AGs intent upon
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enforcing nonprofits' financial accountability. First, AGs could copy
the Act's enhancement of required financial disclosures by public
companies. Second, AGs might mimic some of its attempts to shore up
corporate governance to prevent financial frauds."' All three current
state nonprofit Sarbanes-Oxley analogues include these types of reforms.
The AGs' proposals show some glimmers of concern for organizational
integrity. However, as this Part will show, the reforms concentrate
principally on financial issues: tracking contributions and safeguarding
nonprofit assets. And, they do not address issues of mission
accountability at all.
A. Enhanced Financial Disclosure
In a brief preamble, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act states its goal of
"protect[ing] investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws."15 9 In pursuit
of this goal, the Act instructs the SEC to enact regulations mandating that
top officers of publicly-traded companies personally review their
A full description and analysis of the SFC White Paper's proposals is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, a financial accountability focus can be detected in these
reforms as well. For an extensive discussion of the federal proposals, see Symposium, Who
Guards the Guardians? Monitoring and Enforcement of Charity Governance, 80 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005) (including discussion of proposals for disclosure, enforcement by
federal and state regulators, governance, expansion of equity powers of federal courts, and
accreditation).
... Some of the Act's provisions deal with issues that do not arise in the nonprofit
context or are so tailored to the context of for-profit, publicly-traded companies that they
simply could not be used as a model for nonprofit reform efforts. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, tit. V, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (requiring promulgation of rules to protect
objectivity of securities research analysts).
"ss See Szymanski, supra note 141, at 1312 (predicting similar migration of Sarbanes-
Oxley concepts to nonprofit arena, but separating them into three categories: disclosures,
corporate governance, and auditing).
AGs also might have adapted other Sarbanes-Oxley reforms to the nonprofit context.
Perhaps the greatest share of the legislative reforms imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley is
dedicated to establishing new agencies and empowering existing agencies to enforce
auditing, disclosure, and corporate governance standards. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§
101, 107, 208. State AGs might have followed this model to call for new regulatory bodies
or the injection of funding into existing ones, in an attempt to increase nonprofit
accountability. However, no current state nonprofit law reform proposal establishes a new
enforcement agency or authorizes additional funding for AGs.
5 ' Sarbanes-Oxley Act pmbl. The Act does make clear that it is also intended "for other
purposes," though these are not directly stated in the preamble. Id.
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companies' financial reports and certify their veracity and foundation.
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This certification attests that: the signing officer has reviewed the report;
the report does not contain material untruths, misstatements, or
omissions; and the financial information in the report "fairly present[s]
in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations
of the issuer....",16
The signing officer's seal of approval is only one part of Sarbanes-
Oxley's elaborate certification procedure. The signing officer also must
provide the SEC with information regarding the processes used to obtain
and verify information contained in the reports. Specifically, a signing
officer is charged with the responsibility of establishing and maintaining
internal controls designed to ensure that he and his fellow managers will
obtain accurate information about the company, its finances, and
operation. In addition, the Act uses the certification process to ensure
that important disclosures are made to other internal and external
parties. The signing officer must certify that he has disclosed to the
auditors and audit committee all significant deficiencies and material
weakness in internal controls163 and any fraud involving management or
employees who play a significant role in operating those controls.TM
" Id. § 302(a). The inclusion of this certification requirement has been a mainstay of
press reports and commentary on Sarbanes-Oxley. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over
Substance? Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability under
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2001) (describing and challenging claims of
certification supporters that it will improve corporate accountability); Larry E. Ribstein,
Market Versus Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2002); Steven
Marlin, Absolutely Accountable, INFORMATION WEEK, Oct. 6, 2003, at 51; Price of Change Will
Pay Off in Long Term-William Donaldson, Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Argues that the Costs of Sarbanes-Oxley and Other Reforms are Opportunities from
Which Companies Can Benefit, THE BANKER, Nov. 1, 2003. Even President Bush's brief one-
page statement accompanying his signature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act highlighted the
importance of the certification requirement and its role in improving corporate disclosures.
See Statement by President, supra note 3 ("The legislative purpose of sections 302, 401, and
906 of the Act, relating to certification and accuracy of reports, is to strengthen the existing
corporate reporting system.... ").
"' Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(1)-(3).
162 Id. § 302(a)(4)(A)-(B). To ensure such controls are effective and maintained over
time, signing officers must evaluate the internal controls within 90 days of signing any
relevant report. Id. § 302(a)(4)(C). Moreover, the reports must present a conclusion as to
the effectiveness of the controls over the relevant period, as well as any significant changes
in the controls subsequent to the signing officer's evaluation. Id. § 302(a)(4)(D), (a)(6).
163 Id. § 302(a)(5).
164 Id. § 302. The Act's call for the SEC to establish minimum standards of professional
conduct for attorneys practicing before it plays a complementary role. The Commission's
mandate includes establishing a rule requiring attorneys to report evidence of securities
and fiduciary law violations by an issuer to its chief legal counsel or CEO, and to report it
to the audit committee or another committee of independent directors if appropriate action
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Thereby, Sarbanes-Oxley certification also strives to assure that
individuals and groups, beyond the signing officers, obtain the
information they need to act as an effective backstop.
1. AGs Apply Disclosure Reforms to Nonprofits
Existing statutory and regulatory regimes in most states already
require nonprofits to produce and/or file up to three types of reports, to
which Sarbanes-Oxley-type disclosure enhancements and certification
requirements could be added. Nonprofit corporations typically must:
(1) produce annual internal reports, 16' (2) file with the attorney general at
least summary annual reports regarding their charitable assets, . and (3)
register with state officials and file annual financial information with
them regarding any charitable solicitation efforts they undertake. 167 The
certification requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley could easily be mimicked to
enhance some or all of these existing nonprofit disclosure mechanisms.
The New York bill provides a useful case study of one activist AG's
attempt to do so.168
is not taken in response. Id. § 307. The SEC adopted such rules by final regulation in Aug.
2003. See SEC Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.1-7 (2004). The details of these rules of professional conduct
have been the subject of significant discussion in the academic and popular legal press. See,
e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is there a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?,
48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003); Chi Soo Kim & Elizabeth Laffitte, The Potential Effects of SEC
Regulation of Attorney Conduct Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 16 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 707,
716-21 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, The Ethical & Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for
the Corporation in Responding to Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers or Agents, 70 TENN.
L. REV. 1, 21-23 (2002); Darrel W. Cole, Confidentiality Rule Expanded, DEL. L. WKLY., Apr. 16,
2003, at D1; George D. Royster, The Sarbanes-Oxley Solution, BEST'S REV., Sept. 1, 2003, at 45;
Withdrawal Pains, THE AM. LAW., Apr. 2003, passim.
165 See, e.g., RMNCA, supra note 20, § 7.01(d)(1) (requiring president and chief financial
officer of nonprofit corporation with members to "report on the activities and financial
condition of the corporation" at its annual member meeting).
" See PHELAN, supra note 35, §§ 2:23, 1:04 (describing asset reporting requirements
applied to nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts).
,67 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text; see also Irvin, supra note 107, at 3-5
(collecting and analyzing reporting requirements across jurisdictions).
1' The Massachusetts effort generally tracks the New York bill; the following
discussion will address the points on which they differ materially. As mentioned above,
the California legislation is somewhat more limited with regard to its adoption of Sarbanes-
Oxley-inspired reforms, but its provisions will be addressed when relevant.
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a. Internal Reporting
Under current New York law, the directors of a nonprofit corporation
must prepare an internal annual financial report.9 This report must be
"verified" by the president and treasurer, by a majority of the nonprofit's
directors, or by an independent public accountant, certified public
accountant, or accounting firm. 70 The report must state the assets and
liabilities of the corporation, changes in those assets and liabilities during
the relevant period, information on revenues received and expenditures
disbursed, as well as a current count of the organization's members, if
171
any.
The New York proposal imposes additional verification requirements
for this internal report, tracking both the language of Sarbanes-Oxley
and its financial focus. Indeed, the proposal varies the level of analysis
and disclosure required in these reports, based upon the financial
magnitude of a given nonprofit. The largest nonprofit corporations,
those with assets of at least $3 million or annual revenues or support of
at least $1 million, must add the most comprehensive verifications to
their internal reports. 172 Under the proposal, the president or CEO as
well as the treasurer or CFO of such nonprofits must sign their internal
reports. By their signatures, they must make three types of verifications
clearly drawn from Sarbanes-Oxley. They must verify the truth of the
information disclosed, the reliability of their internal controls, and the
disclosure to appropriate parties of any deficiencies in these controls and
any relevant frauds.17 The bill requires officers of financially smaller
174
nonprofit corporations to make more limited verifications.
As may already be appreciated, the New York proposal's reliance on
Sarbanes-Oxley as a model for its verification requirements is striking.
169 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PRoFIT CORP. LAW § 519 (McKinney 1997).
'I' Id. § 519(a).
Id. § 519(a)(1)-(5). This report must be filed in the records of the corporation, it must
be presented at the annual members' meeting, if any, or at an annual meeting of the board,
and the report, or an abstract of it, must be filed with the minutes of the meeting at which it
is presented. Id. § 519 (b)-(c).
i7 S.B. 4836-B, 227th Leg. Sess. § l(e) (N.Y. 2004). The bill subjects private foundations,
essentially grant-making institutions, to specialized provisions that incorporate federal tax
requirements applicable to them. Id. § l(f)-(g).
1 Id. § 1(e)(1)-(4).
I74 d. § 1(d) (requiring officers of nonprofits with less than $3 million in assets and less
than $1 million in annual gross revenues and support to verify only that they have
reviewed report and believe it fairly presents financial position and operations of
nonprofit); see also id. § 1(e)(5) (exempting entirely from new verification and reporting
standards nonprofits that neither hold charitable assets nor engage in charitable
solicitation, further demonstrating bill's emphasis on financial accountability).
2004]
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Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires officer "certification," while
the New York bill demands "verification," this distinction appears to
create no substantive difference.'75 In describing the specific verifications
to be made in the internal reports of large nonprofits, the New York bill
adopts significant text, verbatim, from Sarbanes-Oxley's certification
requirements for issuers' annual and periodic reports to the SEC, and
changes other language only slightly. The bill's standards of
completeness and accuracy track the Sarbanes-Oxley language in all
significant respects. 176 The New York bill's language regarding "internalfinancial controls," 17 echoes the certifications regarding "internal
175 Presumably, the verification language was chosen to conform with the existing
verification requirements in the New York statute. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§ 519(a) (McKinney 1997) (requiring "verification" of internal financial reports).
176 Compare N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 1(e)(1), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302(2)-(3), Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.) (revealing only following differences: (1) New York bill omits reference to
"financial statements," in addition to "financial information," included in relevant reports;
and (2) New York bill refers to "corporation," rather than "issuer").
17 The New York bill does not define "internal financial controls," although the New
York AG's Charities Bureau recently published a pamphlet offering guidance on the
meaning and appropriate scope of internal controls in nonprofits. See New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, Internal Controls and Financial Accountability for Not-for-Profit
Boards (2004), available at www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/charities.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2004). The Massachusetts draft legislation, which adopts Sarbanes-Oxley's precise
language in this context, does provide an extended definition of "internal controls" for
nonprofits. See Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 1.
The SEC has dealt with the definition of "internal controls" in several rule-making
contexts. The term appears to have originated in standards of the accounting profession.
See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Codification of Statements
on Auditing Standards, AU § 319 (1995). In its rule-making under section 302 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC required signing officers to describe and assess their
"disclosure controls," a new term defined specially for this purpose.
[Tihe term "disclosure controls and procedures" means controls and other
procedures of an issuer that are designed to ensure that information required to
be disclosed by the issuer in the reports that it files or submits under the Act (15
U.S.C. 78a et seq.) is recorded, processed, summarized and reported, within the
time periods specified in the Commission's rules and forms. Disclosure controls
and procedures include, without limitation, controls and procedures designed to
ensure that information required to be disclosed by an issuer in the reports that it
files or submits under the Act is accumulated and communicated to the issuer's
management, including its principal executive officer or officers and principal
financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions, as
appropriate to allow timely decisions regarding required disclosure.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(e) (2004). A definition of "internal control over financial reporting"
also can be found in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f) (2004). The concept of internal control has
more generally been defined as a process, effected by an entity's board of directors,
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of objectives in the following categories: effectiveness and efficiency of
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controls" required by Sarbanes-Oxley.' 78 And the New York bill, like the
federal Act, requires signing officers to attest that they have made
various disclosures to other corporate officers and to the nonprofit's
audit committee or its entire board of directors. 79
b. Asset Reports
Current New York law also demands that most nonprofit corporations
produce and file annual reports with the AG's office if they "hold and
administer property for charitable purposes."'so All nonprofit
operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and
regulations. See The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission, COSO Definition of Internal Control, available at http://www.coso.org/key.htm
(last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
, Compare N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 1(e)(2), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(4)(A)-(B). The
New York bill's requirement that signing officers address the existence and accuracy of
"internal financial controls" is in substance very similar to federal Act's certifications as to
the existence and accuracy of internal controls. Compare N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 1(e)(3), with
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(4)(C)-(D). The New York bill's requirements that signing
officers evaluate their nonprofits' internal financial controls and present conclusions as to
their efficacy are again substantively identical to certifications required by Sarbanes-Oxley.
The original version of the New York bill even more precisely mirrored the federal
statute, using the "internal controls" language and assigning to the signing officers the
responsibility for "establishing and maintaining internal controls" as well as for their
design. See S.B. 4836, 226th Leg. Sess., § 1(e)(4)(A)-(B) (N.Y. 2003). Correspondence
between the AG's office and a New York nonprofit trade association suggests that this
change was intended to address concerns of the nonprofit community with this language.
See Letter from David M. Nocenti, Counsel to the New York Attorney General, to Jon
Small, Chair of the Government Relations Committee of the NPCC, 2 (May 20, 2003) (on
file with author).
"9 Compare N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 1(e)(4)(A), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(5)(A). The
disclosures as to weaknesses in internal controls demanded by the New York proposal are
more general than those required under Sarbanes-Oxley, but address the same basic issue
of whether the controls in place adequately protect data from inaccuracies or fraud.
Compare N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 1(e)(4)(A), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(5)(A). Similarly, the
New York bill's language mandating disclosures of management or employee fraud is
exactly the same as that in the federal Act, save the reference to "internal financial controls."
See N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 1(4)(A) (emphasis added). Compare id., with Sarbanes-Oxley Act §
302(a)(5)(A) (referring only to "internal controls").
Although the New York proposal significantly expands the verifications currently
required in nonprofits' internal reports, it adds little to the penalties for failure to comply
with these provisions. Under existing law, a nonprofit corporation already is liable for
damages sustained by any person as a consequence of its failures to comply, in good faith,
with internal reporting requirements. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 521
(McKinney 1997). The bill specifically declines to create any new private rights of action
against officers, based on their verifications. N.Y. S.B. 4836-B, § 1(h). Standing to challenge
such failures, then, will remain principally with the attorney general.
"I N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(d), (f), (r) (McKinney 2003). Entities
required to register and report also must certify that they have done so in order to apply
for or receive funds from state agencies and departments. Id. § 8-1.4(s). Various types of
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corporations required to report must initially register with the AG T8 and
each year must file signed annual financial reports with the AG's
office.112 AG Spitzer might have proposed officer certifications for these
asset reports as well. In fact, requiring certifications of such official,
external reports, filed with nonprofit regulators and available to donors,
would follow more closely the strategy of Sarbanes-Oxley, which
demands certifications in reports filed with SEC regulators and available
to investors. The Massachusetts draft legislation takes just such an
approach. It requires nonprofit officers to make essentially the same
certifications the New York bill requires for internal reports instead of
the annual financial reports nonprofit corporations must file with the
AG.1 The current New York proposal declines to take this step and
entities, most of which are required to register and report similar financial information to
other government entities, are excepted from all of the registration and reporting
requirements imposed by this section. Id. § 8-1.4(b). Those corporations receiving less than
$25,000 in gross receipts and holding $25,000 or less in assets during a given year also need
not submit asset reports. Id. § 8-1.4(q).
' Id. § 8-1.4 (d) (requiring most corporations that hold and administer property for
charitable purposes to register with attorney general "within six months after any property
held by [it] is required to be applied to charitable purposes"); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 13, § 91.2(a), (b) (2004) (specifying timing and format of registration forms).
Registration forms must be signed under penalties of perjury by the president or other
officer and the chief fiscal officer of the organization. Id. § 91.2(c). Registrants may use
New York-specific forms provided by the attorney general or they may file the URS. Id.
§ 91.2(b)(1)(i).
82 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(f) (requiring annual reports of charitable
assets to be filed with attorney general and that they be signed under penalties of perjury).
These reports generally will include a copy of the organization's Form 990, the
informational tax return that a tax-exempt nonprofit must file with the IRS, and a schedule
of securities held by the organization during the relevant period. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 13, § 91.3.
1 See Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 2(3)-(4); see also id. § 5 (addressing penalties
available for use against nonprofits and fiduciaries who fail to comply with certification
regime). Like the New York Senate bill, the text of the Massachusetts draft legislation
adopts or tracks significant portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements, and
applies two tiers of certification requirements, demanding more rigorous certifications
from officers of nonprofits with greater levels of revenue and support. See id. § 2.
Although it does not impose an officer certification requirement, California's new
legislation also enhances the disclosures required in nonprofit asset reports by mandating
that large revenue nonprofits prepare and file annual audited financial reports with the
attorney general. See The Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919, § 7(e)(1)
(requiring nonprofits that receive or accrue in any fiscal year gross revenues of $2 million
or more to prepare annual reports), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen
/sb_1251-1300/sb_1262bill20040930-chaptered.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). This
legislation also seeks to improve public access to nonprofits' financial reports. See id.
§§ 7(e)(1), 7(f) (requiring nonprofits to make available for public inspection any audited
financial statements they possess, whether prepared for submission to attorney general
with annual asset reports or for other reasons).
20041 Enron.org
limits its verification requirements and remedies to the context of
nonprofits' internal reports.
c. Charitable Solicitation Reports
Finally, New York imposes registration and reporting requirements on
charitable organizations that solicit contributions from persons in the
state or from governmental agencies. 18 4 Again, relevant organizations
must first register with the Ad's and then file annual written financial
reports with the AG's office.'86 Along with these reports, large revenue
organizations and those nonprofits relying on fund-raising professionals
must submit to the AG audited annual financial statements accompanied
by the opinion of an independent certified public accountant) 7
The New York proposal neither enhances the content of these filings
nor adds certification requirements to them."" The New York bill would
impact these filings in only two respects. It would amplify the current
law's mandate of complete and accurate filings'8 9 and increase penalties
m N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 172, 172-b (McKinney 2003). The law also applies to foreign
nonprofit corporations authorized to conduct their activities in New York, if they intend to
solicit contributions or grants in the state. Id. §§ 172, 172-b. Despite its broad reach, several
categories of organizations are exempted from registration and reporting under the
charitable solicitation regulations. Religious organizations, certain organizations soliciting
from a limited group of patrons or members, organizations with very limited financial
resources, and some organizations that file similar reports with other governmental
agencies, are exempt. See, e.g., id. §§ 172-a(1), (2)(a)-(b), (2)(d), (2)(h).
185 Id. § 172(1).
' Id. § 172-b.
I" Id. § 172-b(1) (requiring registered organizations with revenues of over $250,000 to
file annual financial statements, including audit report by independent certified public
accountant, opining that financial statements fairly present financial position of
organization and are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles). Compare id. § 172-b(2) (requiring registered organizations with revenues of
$100,000 to $250,000 annually to file signed and certified materials, but annual financial
statement may include only "independent certified public accountant's review report"
rather than full opinion), with id. § 172-b(2)(a) (permitting registered organizations with
gross revenues between $25,000 and $100,000 to file unaudited financial reports without
financial statements, although reports must still be signed and certified by president or
other officer and chief fiscal officer as "true and correct to the best of their knowledge"),
and id. § 172-a(2)(d) (exempting soliciting organizations that earn annual revenues of less
than $25,000 from registration and reporting entirely).
" Notably, the financial reports that large revenue nonprofits or those using
professional fund-raisers must submit already include verifications similar to some in the
AG's proposal. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b(1) (McKinney 2003) (requiring required report to
be signed by president or other officer and chief fiscal officer of organization, certifying
under penalties of perjury that statements in report are, to best of their knowledge, true
and correct).
... New language emphasizes that it is the duty of nonprofit corporations not merely to
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2. The Financial Focus of AG Nonprofit Disclosure Reforms
The enhancements of nonprofit disclosure in these recent state
proposals are patently targeted to increase financial transparency. The
priority of financial accountability can be seen first in the bills' linkage of
the level of required disclosure to a nonprofit's financial magnitude.
Those nonprofits with greater assets or revenues are required to engage
in more disclosure and their fiduciaries must produce more detailed
certifications. 191  Nonprofits of all sizes suffer losses due to
misappropriation of corporate assets or the misallocation of charitable
contributions. However, AGs display a willingness to devote more
regulatory resources to nonprofits where more money is at stake from
such missteps. The proposals demand only generic assurances from
organizations with smaller levels of assets, while large-asset nonprofits
must engage in a level of self-analysis clearly modeled on Sarbanes-
112Oxley, demonstrating the focus of these AGs on financial concerns.
The items that nonprofit fiduciaries must verify under the New York
and Massachusetts proposals also focus on financial questions. Under
the New York bill, nonprofit fiduciaries and employees must vouch for
the accuracy and authenticity of the financial information contained in
file, but to file "complete and accurate reports." S.B. 4836-B, 227th Leg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y.
2004). Further, current law states that only willful failure to file a required report
constitutes a breach of a director's duty to the corporation. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP.
LAW § 520 (McKinney 1997). The AG's proposal would provide that either willful or
persistent failure to file complete and accurate reports would constitute a breach of duty by
a nonprofit's directors and its officers. N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 2.
" See N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 2 (granting attorney general rights to sue directors or officers
for such failures, and even to seek their removal).
"I Compare N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § I(d), and Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 2(3), with
N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § l(e), and Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra, § 2(4).); see also The Nonprofit
Integrity Act, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919, § 7(e)(1) (enhancing disclosures required under the
new California legislation only for large revenue nonprofits), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb-1251-1300/sb1262 bill_20040930
_chaptered.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
192 Of course, the decision to vary nonprofit disclosure duties with asset and/or
revenue size is not solely a function of the priority of financial accountability. Lower
disclosure requirements for small asset/revenue nonprofits also respond to the inability of
small-scale nonprofit enterprises to engage in the comprehensive reporting and
certifications required by Sarbanes-Oxley type reforms. In fact, the significant increase in
asset/revenue size required to trigger greater disclosure requirements from the original to
the amended New York bill was a response to the outcry from nonprofit organizations and
their counsel that small nonprofits would be overcome by heavy disclosure responsibilities.
See Letter from David M. Nocenti, supra note 178, at 2; Sarbanes-Oxley for Nonprofits, NEW
YORK NONPROFITS, (NPCC) Aug. 5,2003, at 1-2 (on file with author).
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the reports they verify.9 In large asset/revenue nonprofits, officers
must further verify the existence and reliability of internal financial
controls and that any fraud involving management or employees with a
role in those controls has been reported to the audit committee. 194 The
Massachusetts draft is similar.9 None of the proposals expands the
level of disclosure regarding the activities or qualifications of directors or
officers, which might aid in tracking organizational accountability. Nor
do they amplify the disclosures nonprofits must make regarding their
activities or goals, which might assist in tracing mission accountability.
Instead, the disclosure requirements focus on financial information
necessary to track and protect solicited contributions and nonprofit
assets.
The New York proposal's requirement that officer verifications be
attached only to internal reports might be seen as a tip toward
organizational accountability. By forcing verification of internal reports
alone, the bill may encourage nonprofit fiduciaries to run more efficient
and accountable organizations. If nonprofit officers take their
verification roles seriously, this responsibility might prompt them to
investigate the financial integrity of their organizations. However, this
encouragement need not be heeded. The CEO and CFO, often paid staff,
are permissible signatories of these reports. Thus, under this bill, not all
nonprofit fiduciaries need be involved in the project of improving
nonprofit governance, undercutting the proposal's capacity to improve
organizational accountability. 19'
One could argue, of course, that at least some mission or
organizational accountability might be achieved through spillover effects
of the proposals' certification requirements, at least for large-asset
nonprofits. Demanding that these nonprofits establish internal control
mechanisms could encourage organizations to invest in the
infrastructure necessary to police financial and nonfinancial operations
alike. This may result in organizational and even mission accountability
gains. But these effects are far from certain, and full compliance with the
193 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 1(d), (e)(1)(B).
194 Id. § l(e)(4)(A).
195 Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 2(4).
"9 The executive certification requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley have been touted by
their proponents as apt medicine for corporate misconduct because they demand that
executives stand behind their numbers. See supra note 160. The state nonprofit proposals
in fact reveal a general tendency to regulate officers, rather than directors. This focus on
officers is no doubt drawn from Sarbanes-Oxley. But, it is notable and troubling in the
nonprofit context because it will fail to create incentives to bring directors into the
governance process.
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regime imposed by the AGs' bills seems to require attention only to
financial matters.
The AGs' proposed reforms to enhance nonprofit disclosures
unmistakably emulate the means and ends of Sarbanes-Oxley. The New
York and Massachusetts reforms impose officer certification
requirements almost identical to those in the federal Act and designate
strikingly similar financial substance for officers to certify. The financial
accountability focus of these reforms is equally obvious. The financial
orientation of Sarbanes-Oxley is not surprising; its reforms target the for-
profit sector, where recent events suggest that obtaining financial
integrity alone would be a significant improvement. Since
comprehensive nonprofit accountability requires mission and
organizational accountability in addition to this financial component,
one might hope for the governance agenda of AGs' nonprofit reform
proposals to address these other important issues. Unfortunately, these
reforms fall short of this aspiration.
B. Governance Reforms
Sarbanes-Oxley responds in various ways to the perceived failures in
governance that allowed the financial frauds at Enron and elsewhere to
go unchecked, with a particular focus on auditing. It adds new
requirements for service on public company audit committees, in the
interest of ensuring that they have sufficient expertise and independence
to produce reliable financial information, 197 and it assigns to these
committees significant new responsibilities.198 The Act also prohibits
issuers of registered securities from making personal loans to directors
and contemplates the adoption by issuers of a code of ethics for senior
financial officers. 199 To back up these governance mechanisms, the Act
enhances civil and criminal sanctions available to punish offenders. 00
These governance reforms instituted by Sarbanes-Oxley also might be
adapted for use in nonprofit regulation, and some of them have been
197 The law also imposes new limitations on auditors themselves. See, e.g., Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, § 201, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
198 See, e.g., id. §§ 202, 204.
'" Id. § 406 (instructing SEC to issue rules requiring issuers to disclose whether or not
they have adopted code of ethics for senior financial officers, and if not, why not).
' Id. § 1107; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (West 2000); see also Brickey, supra note 139, at 378-82;
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform after the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 387 (2003); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson:
The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 954-64
(2003).
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adopted in the New York and Massachusetts proposals, and the new
California legislation.
1. AGs Apply Governance Reforms to Nonprofits
The current AG proposals are somewhat less reliant on the Sarbanes-
Oxley model in their enunciation of governance reforms than they are in
adopting certification requirements. Still, even when state AGs veer
slightly from the Sarbanes-Oxley pattern in their attempts at nonprofit
reform, the terms of the federal Act and its financial focus remain the
clear starting point for their proposals. Again, the New York proposal
provides the most comprehensive case study. 0 1
a. Default Rules for Committees
The most significant committee-related reforms in both the federal Act
and the New York proposal address the establishment of audit
committees and standards for their performance.20 2  Sarbanes-Oxley
assigns various audit-related responsibilities to all issuers and mandates
that audit committees, or the full board of directors in lieu of such a
committee, must perform these duties.'°  The New York bill's
substantive auditing reforms apply only to a limited class of nonprofits:• 204
those with a significant level of financial magnitude or sophistication.
Therefore, it requires only these nonprofits to establish audit
205
committees. Individual nonprofits also can contract around this
20 Portions of the Massachusetts draft legislation and the new California enactment
will be discussed to the extent they provide relevant contrasts.
" At least one commentator advocated for requiring charities to have an audit
committee function prior to the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. See Karyn R. Vanderwarren,
Note, Financial Accountability in Charitable Organizations: Mandating an Audit Committee
Function, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 976-78 (2002).
203 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 205(a)(58); see also Final NYSE Corporate Governance
Standards, at 9-10 (Nov. 4, 2003) (imposing audit committee requirement for listed
companies), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited
Oct. 11, 2004); The Nasdaq Stock Market, Marketplace Rule 4350(dl) (imposing similar
requirement), available at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer.asp? SelectedNode=
4&FileName=/nasd/nasd-rules/RulesoftheAssociationzmg.xml#chp-1_4 (last visited Oct.
11, 2004).
" See S.B. 4836-B, 227th Leg. Sess. § 4(g)(1) (N.Y. 2004) (imposing new auditing duties
on those nonprofits whose financial reports are audited by certified public accountant, that
have at least $3 million in assets, or that receive at least $1 million in gross revenue and
support in any fiscal year). For a discussion of the substance of these responsibilities, see
infra Part IV.B.1.b.
205 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(1). The original version of the New York bill imposed
auditing responsibilities and the audit committee requirement on nonprofits of
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requirement. 2"' However, as under Sarbanes-Oxley, organizations
without audit committees will not escape the audit responsibilities the
New York bill imposes. In such cases, the full board of directors
assumes these duties.207
The New York proposal also borrows heavily from Sarbanes-Oxley in
drawing its criteria for audit committee independence. The federal Act
issues a directive that all audit committee members must be independent
- which it defines as financial independence2 To be considered
independent, a member of the audit committee must not "accept any
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer," other
than compensation as a member of the board or the audit committee,
and must not be otherwise affiliated with the issuer or any of its
subsidiaries.209 The New York bill demands similar measures of financial
independence for audit committee members. Audit committee members
cannot "accept any consulting fee, advisory fee, or other compensation
or other benefits from the corporation," except compensation received as
a member of the board or its committees.21" Furthermore, to qualify to
serve on an audit committee, a director must not have participated as an
interested party in any transactions with the nonprofit within the prior
211year.
Although Sarbanes-Oxley and the state AG proposals share many
tactics, they do part company on some committee-related reforms. For
instance, the New York bill requires nonprofits with large boards to
significantly less financial magnitude. See S.B. 4836, 226th Leg. Sess. § 4(f) (N.Y. 2003)
(triggering audit committee requirement at annual "gross revenue and support in excess of
two hundred fifty thousand dollars"). The Massachusetts draft legislation and new
California enactment also impose audit committee requirements linked to a nonprofit's
financial magnitude. See Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 3(1) (requiring audit
committees only for public charities that "receive or accrue in any fiscal year gross revenue
and support of at least" $750,000); The Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919, §
7(e)(2) (as signed by governor Sept. 29, 2004) (imposing audit committee requirement on
any charitable corporations that "receives or accrues in any fiscal year gross revenue of...
$2,000,000 or more"), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_1251-
1300/sb_1262_bill 20040930_chaptered.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(1) (excepting from audit committee requirement those
nonprofits whose organic documents forbid use of such committee).
21 Id. § 4 (g)( 2 ); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 205(a)(58)(B) (requiring audit
responsibilities to be carried out by "the entire board of directors of the issuer" if issuer
does not have audit committee).
2"8 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(3)(A)-(B).
2- Id. § 301(3)(B). These independence criteria can be waived by the SEC. Id.
§ 301(3)(C).
210 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(3)(A).
"' Id. § 4(g)(3)(B). These same criteria are adopted in the Massachusetts draft
legislation. Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 3(2).
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name an executive committee, a reform that has no corollary in Sarbanes-
Oxley, the new California statute, or the Massachusetts draft
legislation.212 On the other hand, the state proposals are silent on some
other committee-related requirements that Sarbanes-Oxley does impose.
For example, none of the proposals demand disclosures regarding the
financial expertise of audit committee members, as the federal Act
requires."'
b. New Substantive Auditing Duties
Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the state proposals also impose new
substantive duties on audit committees. Again, however, the two sets of
legislation differ in scope. The federal Act imposes its new auditing
responsibilities on all issuers, while the New York, Massachusetts, and
California reforms' enhanced auditing duties are imposed only on large
nonprofit corporations and those smaller nonprofits that already engage
214in audits. However, one still can trace much of the substance of the
auditing responsibilities prescribed in the state bills directly to Sarbanes-
Oxley. The New York bill speaks in somewhat more general terms than
the federal Act, requiring the audit committee to appoint any accounting
professionals employed to engage in auditing work, to set the
accountants' compensation, and to oversee their work.2 1 ' The bill also
directs the audit committee to receive reports of failures in internal
212 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(f) (imposing an executive committee requirement on nonprofits
with boards of directors of twenty-five or more members, unless a particular nonprofit's
bylaws prohibit use of such committee).
213 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407(a) (directing SEC to adopt rules within months of Act's
adoption to require issuers to disclose in reports to SEC whether their audit committees
include one or more financial experts); 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2004) (adopting such rules).
An earlier version of the California proposal actually did contain a financial competence
requirement for audit committee members - one that was even stronger than Sarbanes-
Oxley's disclosure rule. This language does not appear in the version ultimately enacted.
Compare Attorney General, State of California, Proposed Amendments to Government
Code, Section 12580, at 3 (unpublished memorandum on file with author) (requiring at
least one audit committee member to "have sufficient financial training or experience" to
understand accounting techniques and financial statements and to understand, analyze,
and assess audited financial statements and auditor's competence), with
The Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919, § 7(e)(2) (as signed by governor Sept.
29, 2004) (including no such requirement), available http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill
/sen/sb_1251-1300/sb_1262_bill_20040930_chaptered.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
214 See 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919, § 7(e), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill
/sen/sb_1251-1300/sb_1262_bill_20040930_chaptered.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); N.Y.
S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(1)-(2); Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 3.
ilS N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(2). The Massachusetts draft legislation and California
enactment set similar tasks for audit committees. See Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153,
§ 3(2).
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controls from officers signing required certifications and from
216
accounting professionals engaged in audit functions. The
establishment of these responsibilities mirrors the instructions by
Sarbanes-Oxley that issuers' audit committees must preapprove auditing
217services and receive various mandatory reports and disclosures by a
firm's auditors.218
The New York and Massachusetts proposals also adopt Sarbanes-
Oxley's position that audit committees should enable whistleblowing. In
language virtually identical to that of the federal Act, the New York bill
charges the audit committee with creating a process for receiving
complaints, including the anonymous concerns of employees, regarding
219accounting, accounting controls, auditing, and other financial matters.
Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, however, the New York bill's protection of
whistleblowers stops there. In an attempt to protect individuals who
might bring future scandals to light, the federal Act creates civil and
even criminal penalties for interference with the employment of
corporate whistleblowers220 The New York proposal limits its protection
of whistleblowers to the instruction that nonprofit audit committees
must provide avenues for them to disclose relevant suspicions or
information. In this regard, the Massachusetts draft legislation more
closely approximates Sarbanes-Oxley. Although it does not authorize
criminal sanctions, it would permit the AG to seek various civil remedies
221on behalf of a whistleblower who has experienced retaliation.
216 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B §§ 1(e)(4), 4(g)(2 ).
217 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202 (demanding that issuer's audit committee preapprove all
auditing and non-auditing services provided to issuer, with only de minimis exception).
... Id. § 204(k) (directing auditors to report to audit committee accounting policies,
practices, and alternative treatments of financial information used or considered in audit,
and any material communications between auditing firm and management of issuer).
219 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(4). Compare id., with Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(4) (instructing
issuers' audit committees to "establish procedures for (A) the receipt, retention, and
treatment of complaints received by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting
controls, or auditing matters; and (B) the confidential, anonymous submission by
employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing
matters"). The Massachusetts draft legislation goes one step further; in addition to
requiring audit committees to establish procedures to receive, retain, and treat these
complaints, they are also instructed to forward such complaints to the attorney general on
at least an annual basis. See Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 3(4)-(5). The California
enactment does not impose a whistleblowing function on nonprofit audit committees.
2"o See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1107.
"1 See Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0, supra note 153, § 5(a) (providing for employee to be
reinstated and receive compensation and backpay, as well as allowing for imposition of
order prohibiting recurrence of unlawful retaliatory conduct at issue). Notably, New
York's general whistleblower law will make many of the same remedies available to an
employee who brings a civil action, but it does not invoke the attorney general's authority.
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c. Regulation of Directors and Officers
Finally, both the New York bill and Sarbanes-Oxley substantively
regulate the loyalty of corporate fiduciaries. 221 Sarbanes-Oxley does so
by prohibiting issuers from extending credit to their officers or
directors.23  New York nonprofit law already imposes such a ban on
personal loans to nonprofit directors and officers. 22' But AG Spitzer
again took a cue from Sarbanes-Oxley by including within his reform
proposal a substantial overhaul of the state's legal framework for
regulating interested party transactions.
Currently, New York law protects transactions between a nonprofit
corporation and one or more of its directors or officers, 26 so long as they
are approved by a sufficient vote of disinterested directors or members,
after full disclosure of any relevant conflicts of interest.227 This vote alone
See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2002).
222 Stand-alone legislation addressing interested party transactions in nonprofit
corporations also was introduced in the New York State Assembly in 2004. See S.B. 7219A,
227th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2004); A.B. 11292A, 227th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2004). The provisions of
these bills are identical to Section 5 of AG Spitzer's nonprofit Sarbanes-Oxley proposal,
which would repeal N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1997), and
substitute it with the new language and provisions described infra notes 228-32 and
accompanying text.
223 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402; see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale,
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859,
877 (2003).
224 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 716 (McKinney 1997).
" The Massachusetts draft legislation likewise takes this opportunity to revise its legal
regime governing related party transactions and compensation. See Mass. Draft Leg. 1.0,
supra note 153, § 4. The California enactment adds just one new requirement, that boards
of directors must review the compensation of their president/CEO and treasurer/CFO
upon initial employment and at each new employment contract, contract renewal, or
modification. See The Nonprofit Integrity Act, 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 919, § 7(g) (as signed by
governor Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_1251-
1300/sb_1262.bill_20040930_chaptered.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
The New York bill also includes various modifications to nonprofit indemnification
law. See S.B. 4836-B, 227th Leg. Sess. § 6 (N.Y. 2004). The original bill included a more
"thorough-going revision" of the state's indemnification regime for nonprofits, but the
AG's office trimmed its indemnification proposals in response to a wary reception from
nonprofit organizations and their counsel. See Remarks of William Josephson, Assistant
Attorney General-in-Charge, Charities Bureau, to the Funders Alliance of Upstate New
York 8 (Sept. 30, 2003) (on file with author).
226 In addition to these classic interested transactions, the proposed new statute
includes as an interested transaction any contract or transaction, entered into directly or
indirectly, between a nonprofit corporation and a director or officer of one of its affiliates or
between an entity in which an affiliate's director or officer is a fiduciary or has a substantial
financial interest. N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5(a).
"I N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(a) (McKinney 1997). If appropriate
disclosure and/or voting does not occur to bless the transaction, the statute states that the
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would appear to protect self-dealing transactions from avoidance. The
current statute imposes no explicit additional requirement of substantive
fairness to safeguard a procedurally correct transaction. The New York
proposal would add such a fairness and reasonableness requirement in
order to protect any interested transaction.m It also would provide a
safe harbor; an interested transaction will be presumed to be fair and
reasonable to a corporation if additional procedures are followed.22 9 In
addition to a vote of disinterested directors after full disclosure, the
additional procedures require approving directors to obtain and use
comparability data to evaluate the transaction prior to approving it and
to document the basis for their approval.2 3° Under the proposal, either
the relevant nonprofit or the AG may move to void or modify
noncompliant interested transactions, so long as doing so would not
further damage the nonprofit.23 ' The corporation or the AG also may
seek monetary compensation from the interested parties and approving
directors, if they are unable to prove the fairness and reasonableness of
232the challenged transaction.
The New York proposal also imposes a new and stricter approval
process for director and officer compensation.2 3 Presently, state law
does not specifically address nonprofit director compensation other than
transaction will be voidable unless the interested parties can affirmatively establish it to
have been fair and reasonable to the corporation at the time it was undertaken. Id. § 715(b).
12 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5(a). Interestingly, the proposed bill requires that the interested
party and any approving director must establish the fairness and reasonableness of any
relevant transaction, in order to preclude its avoidance. Id.
9 Id. § 5(b).
o Id. § 5(b)(1)-(3). The bill requires that nonprofit corporations specifically document
the date and terms of interested transactions, the members of the board or committee who
approve them, the comparability data used to evaluate the transactions and the provenance
of such data, and any actions by interested directors regarding consideration of these
transactions. Id. § 5(b)(3).
Rather than mimicking the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these sections of the New
York bill borrow from another area of federal law, Internal Revenue Code § 4958 and its
accompanying regulations, which impose a framework for approving and sanctioning self-
dealing transactions in certain tax-exempt entities. Compare N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5(b), with 26
C.F.R. § 53.4958-6(a) (2002). This framework was suggested by nonprofit organizations in
response to the similar, but somewhat more complex, safe harbor provided by the original
bill. See Draft Memorandum to Eliot Spitzer et al., from NPCC Government Relations
Committee Attached to Letter from Jon Small, Chair of the NPCC Government Relations
Committee to Eliot Spitzer et al., 22-23 (Mar. 14, 2003) (on file with author); Letter from
David M. Nocenti, supra note 178, at 3.
23 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5(c).
232 This compensation is determined by reference to penalties imposed under the
federal tax regime described, supra note 230, regardless of whether the IRS could or does
take action under that regime. See N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5(c).
233 See N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5(e)-(f).
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to permit the board to set it,2m though as a transaction between a
corporation and its directors, it would be covered by the general
requirements for interested transactions. The new proposal requires
director compensation for board service to be set by an affirmative vote
of a majority of the entire board and to be fair and reasonable. 23
Compensation decisions are subject to these rules regardless of their
magnitude, although other types of interested transactions are exempt
from the new safe harbor procedures if the interested party is unaware of
the transaction and it is of relatively small financial value.2 Moreover,
the bill imposes monetary liability on approving board or committee
members if they fail to follow the special procedures it dictates for
237
compensation decisions.
2. The Financial Focus of AG Nonprofit Governance Reforms
The state proposals' mandated changes to governance structures may
have some effect on organizational accountability, but the regulatory
impact of these changes remains concentrated on financial
accountability. The executive committee requirement for large boards is
perhaps the New York bill's best example of pure organizational
accountability reform. It takes as its starting point the proposition that
the mere size of a very large board inhibits its ability to function as a
demanding supervisor of organizational affairs.23' Therefore, the bill
requires the designation of a subgroup more able to play that vital
organizational role, so long as the nonprofit's organic documents do not
prohibit it from doing so. This mandate forces nonprofits to alter their
structures in order to improve the likelihood of director attention and
effectiveness, seemingly in an attempt to strengthen organizational
" See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(e) (McKinney 1997). As to officer
compensation, current law merely requires an affirmative vote by a majority of the board,
unless some higher voting threshold is provided by the corporation's charter or bylaws. Id.
§ 715(0.
23 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5(f). Director and officer compensation for services other than
those as directors or officers may be set by the board, by a vote of the members, or by a
board committee, provided that committee members may not be compensated by the
corporation other than as directors. Id. § 5(e). Throughout the compensation context, the
New York proposal defines fairness and reasonableness by reference to federal tax
requirements described, supra note 230. See N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5.
236 N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 5(h) (exempting from interested transaction regime those non-
compensation transactions of which relevant fiduciary has no actual knowledge and that
are valued at $100,000 or less than 1% of nonprofit's gross receipts for prior year,
whichever is lower).
" Id. § 5(c). Liability is again determined by reference to the federal tax regime. Id.
23 See Remarks of William Josephson, supra note 225, at 12-13.
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accountability. However, interestingly, the original bill triggered the
executive committee requirement not on the basis of board size, but
rather on the basis of the nonprofit's annual revenues, suggesting that
the initial motive was financial. 39
Unfortunately, even utilizing board size as the trigger for a required
executive committee, the impact of this requirement is blunted because
the New York bill does not actually assign any tasks to these committees.
This is not to say the reform is useless, just short of ideal. Requiring
large boards to designate this committee expresses concern for the
problems of very large boards and forces them to confront the problem
of size at least once. If executive committees exist in name only, they are
unlikely to achieve any organizational accountability gains. But once
executive committees are formed, at least in some cases, they will take on
tasks and improve the performance of nonprofits.
The auditing reforms in all of the state proposals also include elements
of organizational accountability reform. These reforms take the lesson
from Sarbanes-Oxley that audit functions are important and that their
independence from other functions of directors and officers is necessary
to produce reliable audit information. Thus, the reforms require
nonprofits of a certain financial size or level of sophistication to institute
audit committees to serve this function. By creating a governance
structure and establishing qualifications for participation within it, these
reforms seek organizational accountability. They attempt to increase
directors' attention, objectivity, and effectiveness. And the audit
committee reforms in the proposals are a significant improvement over
the executive committee requirement in the New York bill in this regard,
because they assign several significant tasks to audit committees.
However, the auditing reforms' attempts to improve organizational
accountability exist primarily in service of financial accountability goals.
The proposals target specific groups of nonprofits upon which to impose
the audit committee structure; these groups line up precisely with
financial accountability's twin. aims of asset and donor protection.
240
Each requires an audit committee for nonprofits with significant assets,
revenues, or support, targeting those nonprofits with the greatest
' Compare N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(f) (requiring executive committee for nonprofits with
more than 25 directors), with S.B. 4836, 226th Leg. Sess. § 4(f) (N.Y. 2003) (requiring
executive committee for nonprofits with more than $250,000 in annual gross revenue and
support).
" Again, concern over the capacity of small asset/revenue nonprofits to comply with
complex committee structures also likely played a role in setting these financial triggers.
See supra note 192.
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amount of assets to protect. The New York bill also requires an audit
committee to be established within nonprofits that already obtain
audited financial statements, which likely do so to comply with
241
regulatory requirements regarding charitable solicitation.
Furthermore, the office for which each proposal demands more
accountable organizational structures is quintessentially financial. The
AGs' proposals charge audit committees with keeping track of their
nonprofits' financial assets by acquiring auditors' reports, disclosures
regarding weaknesses in internal financial controls and internal frauds,
and collecting whistleblower complaints regarding accounting, auditing,
and other financial matters.
Finally, even the reforms of interested party transaction law target
financial accountability. The New York and Massachusetts proposals
focus on nonprofit directors and officers and establish board procedures
for safeguarding various transactions from attack. However, the
transactions in question are those that threaten a nonprofit's assets -
loyalty breaches, with all three bills particularly focusing on executive
compensation. These reforms invoke governance solutions, but they do
not appear to do so in order to make boards function better or to focus
nonprofit fiduciaries on issues of mission. Rather, the proposals use
governance solutions in order to achieve financial accountability: to
protect nonprofit assets and, by extension, donors.
In working their governance reforms, the AGs' proposals closely
follow relevant portions of Sarbanes-Oxley. The adaptations of the
federal Act's provisions in this context are not uniformly as direct as in
the proposals' disclosure reforms, but the influence of Sarbanes-Oxley on
their drafters is clear. The governance reforms introduced by these
proposals again demonstrate the precedence of financial accountability
in the AGs' nonprofit enforcement agenda. They require enhanced
committee structures in financially significant and sophisticated
nonprofits, but not in their smaller counterparts. The proposals impose
their most aggressive reforms of governance structure in the context of
auditing, concentrating these additional governance resources on
tracking nonprofits' finances. In their reforms of fiduciary law, the
proposals address those situations where nonprofit assets are most at
risk: instances of self-dealing transactions and compensation. In all of
these respects, these proposals repeat the financial accountability focus
seen in AGs' efforts across the spectrum of nonprofit enforcement.
241 Existing state law requires an audit for those nonprofits that engage in charitable
solicitation of more than $250,000 annually or that use a professional fundraiser. N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 172-b(1) (McKinney 2003).
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C. Conclusions from State Efforts to Adapt Sarbanes-Oxley to Nonprofits
The commonality among all of Sarbanes-Oxley's disclosure and
governance reforms is that each addresses financial accountability as its
principal, if not its exclusive, aim. The recent nonprofit reform
legislation proposed by activist state AGs adopts the same financial
orientation. Some of the reform measures may affect organizational
accountability, but a careful analysis of the proposals reveals that their
priority is to protect donors and nonprofit assets. Any impact on
mission accountability achieved by these reforms will occur merely by
happenstance.
AGs do indeed seem to be ramping up their enforcement efforts in the
nonprofit context. They are using their authority to initiate litigation and
their regulatory powers to expand monitoring of nonprofits. At the
vanguard, a few AGs have advocated for new nonprofit legislation using
Sarbanes-Oxley as a model. In each of these efforts, the priority of
financial accountability to AGs is apparent. The New York Attorney
General's Office has billed its reforms for the nonprofit sector as
consumer protection, though this time for donors, and its safeguards are
specifically described as protection against the dissipation of charitable
242assets. Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly described his draft
legislation as addressing the need for charities "to restore the trust and
confidence of donors, the public and regulators in their financial
competence and integrity;" California Attorney General Bill Lockyer
likewise hopes his legislation will "shore up donor confidence." 243 The
substance of these proposed reforms demonstrates, once again, that
financial accountability concerns dominate AGs' nonprofit enforcement
agendas, bearing out the predictions of AG priorities made in Part II.
Thus, even activist state AGs will fail to assure comprehensive nonprofit
accountability. With this in mind, Part V begins the process of
considering alternative mechanisms by which nonprofits' mission and
organizational accountability might be enforced effectively.
242 See N.Y. AG Press Release, supra note 145, at 1.
243 Mass. Summary, supra note 145, at 1; Williams, Calif. Passes New Law, supra note 155,
at 32 (quoting AG Lockyer's comments on the California legislation).
[Vol. 38:205
Enron.org
V. THOUGHTS ON COMPLEMENTS TO AG ENFORCEMENT
Renewed vigor by AGs to regulate charitable solicitation, to litigate
duty of loyalty violations, or to legislate additional disclosure or auditing
mechanisms does not address mission and organizational accountability
- or impacts them only as unintended, if positive, consequences. Thus,
some other mechanisms must be found or created to tackle these real,
though often less concrete, challenges. Various commentators have
advocated the establishment of new government entities or the use of
other governmental or regulatory pathways in order to deter failures of
nonprofit accountability.24  This Part takes a different approach and
instead offers initial thoughts on the extent to which self-regulatory
means of addressing accountability problems may be used to improve
organizational integrity and control mission creep in the nonprofit
sector. Of course, a full evaluation of these techniques is a topic for
another day. The purpose of this Article is to explain the financial
accountability bias of state AGs and the need for additional enforcement
mechanisms to complement AG efforts. The discussion that follows is
intended only to begin the quest to find these complementary methods
of enforcing nonprofit accountability.
A. Contracting for Accountability
One means of attaining any goal familiar to lawyers and legal scholars
is through contract. For contracting to improve nonprofit mission and
organizational accountability, at least three preconditions are necessary.
First, some institution or institutions must be available and interested in
contracting with nonprofits for mission and organizational
accountability. Second, nonprofits must have some interest in engaging
in these contracts. These first two preconditions essentially require
parties to serve as willing buyers or sellers. In addition to an interest in
2 See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 1, at 272 (proposing establishment of citizen advisory
commissions to assist AGs in their oversight of charities by receiving and reviewing
complaints regarding activities of charities, their fiduciaries, and employees); Joel L.
Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizations and the Need for Regulatory Reform, in
PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 188-91 (C.T.
Clotfelter & T. Erlich eds., 1999) (advancing idea that independent federal agency should
be created to deal with all aspects of nonprofit regulation); Hansmann, supra note 1, at
568-73, 606-22 (advocating comprehensive statutory reform program, including, inter alia,
heightened standards for nonprofit fiduciaries, broadened standing to litigate alleged
violations of nonprofit fiduciaries, and enhanced disclosure obligations); Karst, supra note
1, at 476-83 (proposing establishment of new state regulatory agencies to supervise
charities, including monitoring and investigation of fiduciaries and enforcement of their
obligations).
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participating in a contracting solution, achievement or enhancement of
organizational or mission accountability through contract also requires
some means of contractual enforcement, the third precondition. Each
side must be able to enforce the contracts it makes.
Professor Geoffrey Manne has suggested a creative contractual
solution to nonprofit accountability. 245 He advocates the establishment of
contract plaintiffs with standing to sue nonprofit fiduciaries for
violations of their duties and nonprofit corporations for violations of
their charters. He envisions a market for these contracts, where various
for-profit monitoring agencies would vie to serve paying nonprofits in a
contract plaintiff capacity. Manne's contract plaintiffs could thereby
challenge violations of all three types of nonprofit accountability,
without the political constraints experienced by AGs and without
spurring waves of vexatious litigation. If such a market were to develop,
it might well operate as a useful supplement to the finance-focused
enforcement efforts of AGs. Of course, because such a market has not
yet developed, one cannot be certain of the viability of this proposal in
general. Further, the utility of adopting Manne's solution specifically to
compensate for AGs' failures to enforce mission and organizational
accountability is questionable. For-profit purveyors of contract plaintiff
services might well concentrate their litigation efforts on failures of
financial accountability for the same practical reasons government
litigators do so.
However, at least for the subset of nonprofits that receive grant
funding, private and government funders comprise an existing set of
potentially interested contracting parties. These funders already engage
in tracking nonprofits' financial accountability, to some extent.
Recipients of funding from the federal government must provide
significant documentation along with their applications and renewals,
often including detailed financial auditing.246 Foundations also require
grantees to repare reports tracking how and where grant distributions
are spent. Government and private foundation funders might be
convinced that it is in their interest to contract for mission and
organizational accountability as well. If these funders did begin to desire
241 See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations,
1999 Wis. L. REV. 227, 253 (1999).
' See, e.g., U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-110 (Sept. 30, 1999)
(requiring nonprofit recipients of federal grants to file annual Financial Status Reports),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a110/a110.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2004); see also Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 486-87.
247 Paul N. Ylvisaker, Foundations and Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR, supra note 140, at 360, 365.
[Vol. 38:205
Enron.org
or demand mission and organizational accountability from grant
recipients, grantee nonprofits would have a very basic incentive to
produce it: their need for funds.
There is some potential for useful contracting to occur in this context
because funders have a vested interest in the mission and organizational
accountability of the nonprofits they fund. Funders choose grantees
with the hope of enabling a successful program or set of programs, in
support of a range of goals and purposes the grantor and grantee share.
If, through mission creep, a grantee's focus drifts from the range of
shared purposes, the efficacy of the grant in achieving the funders' goals
may be diminished. Further, when a funder makes a grant to a
nonprofit, it must rely on the capacity and competence of the
organization to transform these funds, in concert with its other resources,
into some program or activity. Rather than running programs or
activities on their own, grantmakers outsource the operation of programs
they desire. If the nonprofit to whom they entrust their goals is sloppily
managed, achievement of these goals is endangered. And, of course,
nonprofits that attend to their mission and the integrity of their
organizations may be better stewards or users of granted funds.
Therefore, funders may be willing to contract for mission and
organizational accountability, both for the independent utility of these
kinds of accountability and as a means toward improving financial
accountability.
Furthermore, both sides of a grantor-grantee arrangement have
mechanisms by which to enforce contracts regarding organizational and
mission accountability. Funders already condition their grants on
various terms, often requiring grant applicants to describe how they
would meet these terms and to report on their progress during grant
administration or to obtain a renewal. 24' Grantors seeking to contract for
organizational accountability might simply require new representations
as to grantees' governance in the application process, and demand
periodic reporting on governance activities during a grant or upon
application for renewal. Tracking mission would be more difficult, but
creative grantmakers could find the means to do so. Perhaps they could
contract for a grantee to provide intermittent reports explaining how its
activities continue to support its mission, or for briefings on how a
grantee's mission is legitimately evolving.
21 See GRANTS MANAGEMENT NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES IN GRANTS MANAGEMENT
(2001).
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Funders could, therefore, perhaps operate as a useful contracting
adjunct to the enforcement provided by AGs. However, this is not a
solution without obstacles. On a practical level, funders must be
persuaded that tracking these additional accountability measures offers
benefits to them that exceed the cost of administration, likely a difficult
task with funders anxious to keep administrative costs low. Indeed,
recent media reports and Congressional efforts have challenged the level
.. . .. 249
of foundation costs of administration as already too high. In these
days of budget deficits, the political branches also may be unwilling to
allocate the resources necessary to improve public grant administration.
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, setting funders to the task of
improving mission and organizational accountability may be a mismatch
to even their best capabilities because funders' priorities may, at times,
cause illegitimate mission creep. With grants in short supply, nonprofit
directors or managers may informally shift their activities and priorities
to match those funding streams available to them. Foundations and
government entities might be convinced of the utility of policing their
grantees' fidelity to the purposes for which they have received
foundation or government funds. However, monitoring accountability
to grantees' organizational purposes would demand greater objectivity
and would require these funders to act out of more than enlightened
self-interest. Further, relying on private foundations to monitor and
enforce nonprofit accountability may be perceived as quite odd, since the
private foundation segment of the nonprofit sector is often singled out as
most prone to accountability failures and fiduciary misbehavior.] These
caveats suggest that while this kind of contract solution to enforcing
nonprofit mission and organizational accountability might develop to
some extent, it is doubtful that grantor-grantee contracting alone can fill
these serious gaps in AG enforcement.
B. Signaling Intermediaries
Another potential avenue for enforcement is to establish an apparatus
that would provide signals of nonprofits' relative organizational and
29 Susan Carey Dempsey, Points of View on Foundation Payout Increase, ON
PHILANTHROPY (May 31,2003), available at http://www.onphilanthropy.com/tren-comm
/tc2003-05-31.a.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004); Independent Sector, Position Statement on
Section 105, Reform of Certain Excise Taxes Related to Private Foundations, of The
Charitable Giving Act of 2003 (H.R. 7), available at http: //www.independentsector.org
/media/105statement.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
1 Crimm, supra note 51, at 1132; Stamler, supra note 116, at Fl; Remarks of William
Josephson, supra note 225, at 7.
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mission accountability to which donors, patrons, and nonprofits
themselves might respond.2' Perhaps intermediaries could be
established to review nonprofits' performance in these areas, and award
them ratings to use in marketing themselves, particularly to donors.
Through their Wise Giving Alliance program, the Better Business Bureau
("BBB") and the National Charities Information Bureau ("NCIB") joined
together to investigate and offer reports on the operations of charities in
2001.252  Other public and private entities also have entered the
marketplace to engage in this kind of charity rating, often with a
particular focus on financial issues.2" The Maryland Association of
Nonprofit Organizations has launched an accreditation program for its
members and has replicated the program in several other states.2 The
Wise Giving Alliance has focused broadly on the various types of
accountability issues discussed here, and recently began offering to
charities the opportunity to obtain its National Charity Seal.2" In effect,
" For a general discussion and evaluation of standard-setting and accreditation efforts
in the nonprofit sector, see Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 480-82.
See also Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding Themselves: A Comparative Perspective on
Nonprofit Self-Regulation, 80 CR.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (offering comparative
analysis of accreditation techniques in Asia and United States).
" See Give.org, About the BBB Wise Giving Alliance, available at
http://www.give.org/about/ index.asp (last visited Oct. 20,2004).
See, e.g., American Institute of Philanthropy, Charity Rating and Watchdog Report,
available at http://www.charitywatch.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); Charity Navigator,
How Do We Rate Charities, available at http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm/bay/
content.view/catid/2/cpid/35.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); Office of New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Pennies for Charities 2003, available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/pennies03/penintro.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004);
see also Taking Aim at Foundation Accountability, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 52 (Winter
2003) (describing Surdna Foundation's current consideration of preparing "Zagat's guide"
to foundations). See generally Independent Sector, Accountability: Who's Doing What?
(collecting and describing accountability code and standard-setting efforts of large range
of organizations), available at http://www.independentsector.org/issues/accountability
/standards2.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
' See Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations, Earn the Standards for
Excellence Seal: An Introduction to the Standards for Excellence (describing group's Standards
for Excellence program, in which nonprofits submit to review of various aspects
of their operations, in order to obtain accreditation), available at
http://www.marylandnonprofits.org/html/standards/index.asp (last visited Oct. 11,
2004). This program has received substantial attention from the press, and recently from
the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, which advocated substantial use of accreditation
programs in several of the proposals in its bipartisan staff discussion draft. See SFC White
Paper, supra note 156, at 14-15; Rachel Emma Silverman, Charities Start to Grade Themselves,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2004, at DI.
' Give.org, BBB Wise Giving Alliance, Questions and Answers About the Seal for National
Charities, available at http://www.give.org/seal/faq.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). The
Alliance looks at four areas when it rates charities: governance and oversight, measuring
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part of Professor Manne's contract plaintiff solution also provides a
signaling function. He explains, "a donative charity perceived as
uncontrolled in the midst of well-controlled alternative charities will be
at a competitive disadvantage for the scarce dollars that are given to
nonprofits.2 5
Signaling is certainly an option worthy of consideration and review.
Yet, signaling works only if consumers will change their behavior in
response to the signal, and will do so to an extent that motivates
producers to change their behavior to improve their rating. Donors do
seem interested in information regarding the percentage of donated
funds used for charitable purposes, as opposed to administrative costs.
25 7
Similarly, they might like to know whether an organization to which
they plan to contribute adheres to its mission and operates in line with
its legal governance structure. But, would a high rating on these
metrics actually induce a donor to give or to give more? Perhaps donors
would prefer mission to creep and make their contributions in order to
secure change. Maybe donors consider legal governance to be costly and
unimportant proceduralism, and would prefer organizations not to
expend resources on it. Or, donors simply may value other information
more in determining whether and how much to give, for their own
idiosyncratic or non-rational reasons. It is not yet certain whether
donors would respond sufficiently to a rating of mission and
organizational accountability to inspire nonprofits supported by
effectiveness, finances, and fundraising and informational materials. The first two areas
address issues of organizational and mission accountability, respectively, while the latter
two deal with financial concerns. The Alliance touts its comprehensive approach,
explaining that it is different from other intermediaries because it:
[Ljooks beyond "the numbers" while many other charity watchdogs confine
their reports and conclusions solely to the charity's finances. The Alliance
evaluates the charity's governance, fund raising practices, solicitations and
informational materials, as well as how it spends its money. Therefore,
compliance with this seal will send a more complete confirmation of the charity's
accountability.
Id. The Maryland Standards for Excellence accreditation program also takes a wide-
ranging approach, listing "Mission and Programs" as its first area for review and setting
several governance benchmarks. See Maryland Association of Nonprofit Organizations,
supra note 254.
" See Manne, supra note 245, at 254.
257 See Stamler, supra note 116, at Fl; Strauss, supra note 12, at F17.
" Cf. Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and Those Who Control
Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141, 154 (1995) (asserting
that "[tihe aggregation of informed individual judgments about what constitutes 'public
benefit' results is more likely to give us what we want from our nonprofit sector than will
attempts to legislate the ideal.").
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contributions to improve.259
Furthermore, before signaling can improve mission and organizational
accountability across the nonprofit sector, constituencies beyond donors
also must be persuaded to heed such signals. Many fee-based nonprofits
rely more heavily on consumer patronage than on donors for their
financial well-being. In some industries where many commercial
nonprofits operate, accreditation organizations signal the quality of the
services nonprofits provide. 26  Particularly in the health care and
education industries, accreditation can be a key tool in obtaining and
maintaining substantial consumer bases. 26' To the extent that these or
other valued accreditation systems include an analysis of the mission
and organizational accountability in their evaluations and ratings of a
nonprofit health care or educational institution, they provide a signal to
which consumers and nonprofit producers could respond. Many such
accrediting organizations explicitly inquire into the mission of the
nonprofits they evaluate, how it is articulated and serviced by the
institution's programs, and ask serious questions about governance
mechanisms.262 However, for this type of signaling solution to work in
the commercial nonprofit arena, students, patients, and payors must be
persuaded that following signals regarding mission and organizational
accountability would serve their purposes. It remains to be seen whether
these non-donor groups can be effectively persuaded to respond to these
signals.
' See David Bornstein, Let's Make Sure Worthy Groups Get Aid, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 22, 2004, at 37 (opining that "most donors... pay little attention to the
comparative performance of the organizations they support," based on the limited
information currently available, and advocating establishment of nonprofit research
analysts to provide more).
26" See, e.g., Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO),
What is JCAHO? (describing JCAHO accreditation process for health care organizations),
available at http://www.jcaho.org/general+public/who+jc/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2004).
261 See Council for Higher Education (CHEA), Informing the Public About Accreditation
(describing purposes and process of higher education accreditation), available at
http://www.chea.org/publicjinfo/index.asp#what (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); JCAHO,
Hospitals, How to Become Accredited, Benefits of Accreditation (noting that JCAHO
accreditation can facilitate approval to receive payment from Medicare and Medicaid,
as well as from third party insurers), available at http://www.jcaho.org/htba/hospitals
/benefits+of+accreditation.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
262 See, e.g., MIDDLE STATES COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF
EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1-3, 10-15 (2002) (describing requirements for meeting
MCHE's standards for "Mission, Goals and Objectives" and "Leadership and
Governance"), available at www.msache.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
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Lastly, for signaling to work, honest and effective raters of nonprofits
must exist. An adaptation of Manne's contract plaintiff proposal to this
purpose would envision a private market for these intermediaries. In
this marketplace, intermediaries would offer rating services to nonprofits
for a fee, in a model similar to that of health care or educational
accreditation. Alternatively, as already has been seen, nonprofit private
or public institutions might volunteer to serve as raters of mission and
organizational accountability, financed by contributions or government
funds. Either funding method would, of course, require the outlay of
resources from typically strapped nonprofits or the public. The resource
requirements of a signaling solution, like all of the potential
complementary mechanisms presented here, may undercut its feasibility.
Even if the resource requirements could be met, additional research is
necessary to understand how accrediting organizations conduct their
programs and to evaluate the effectiveness of the techniques they
employ. In addition, some provision would need to be made to monitor
the accreditors.
C. Training and Empowering Nonprofit Actors
A final method to complement AG enforcement of nonprofits'
financial accountability is for the state or the nonprofit sector itself to
commit to train those individuals involved with nonprofits in the
importance of mission and organizational accountability, and to
empower them to self-regulate. 263 In a practical sense, self-regulation is
already the norm in these areas, because AGs have little incentive or
ability to focus on them. However, committing resources to educating
nonprofit actors in how to achieve and maintain these underenforced,
but critical, aspects of accountability and empowering them to self-
264
enforce, could enhance the effectiveness of self-regulation. A
commitment of educational resources might be obtained from AGs 6 5 If
nonprofit regulators could, as a group, be convinced to allocate a portion
' Others have noted the importance of self-regulation as a complement to attorney
general enforcement in more general terms. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 244, at 186-87
(advocating creation of self-monitoring institutions within nonprofit sector, in order to
complement governmental enforcement).
" See Swords, supra note 8, at 607-09.
26 In a recent speech, AG Spitzer noted the importance of educating and training
nonprofit fiduciaries in their financial role in promoting nonprofit accountability. Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, Keynote Address at Baruch College Conference, "New Pressures on
Nonprofit Boards," (Feb. 19, 2004) (notes of speech on file with author) (stating concerns
that some directors are unaware of their responsibilities to "look at financial statements"
and "know where the money went" and asserting that "best thing" to do is "to educate).
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of their budgets to providing or purchasing training services for
nonprofits in their jurisdictions, that would be a grand solution.
However, the incentive structure in which AGs operate, as discussed in
Part II, makes it unlikely AG education efforts alone will sufficiently
promote mission and organizational accountability.
But, one must not simply throw up one's hands in the face of a lack of
interest by AGs. To remain thriving, important, and trusted, the
nonprofit sector needs its organizations to demonstrate and cherish
mission and organizational accountability. Therefore, the nonprofit
sector itself should commit to compensating for a lack of government
enforcement of these important components of nonprofit accountability.
It can perhaps best do so through a commitment to training, capacity
building, and institutional support. Many existing nonprofit trade
associations have the knowledge and skills to offer training in improving
mission and organizational accountability. They already offer programs
and products to train nonprofit directors, officers, and employees in
26
accounting, technology, and fund-raising. They should also provide or
increase their provision of legal and practical training on how to govern
267
a nonprofit in compliance with its organizational form. And, they
should broaden their existing offerings to include or increase training for
268
these nonprofit actors in how to evaluate and track mission. Other
approaches might attempt to restructure governance or standing rules to
261 270
empower employees, members, or even the public271 to monitor
26 See Support Center for Nonprofit Management, Customized and On Site Training
Services, available at http://www.supportctr.org/customized-training.php (last visited Oct.
20, 2004); Technical Assistance for Community Services (TACS), Training
and Consulting Resources for Nonprofit Organizations, available at http://www.tacs.org
/training/dirtemplate.asp?pID=42 (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); see also Council of
Community Services of New York State, Inc., Helping Nonprofits-Training (advertising
training offered to nonprofit directors by consortium of state agencies other than attorney
general), available at http://www.ccsnys.org/np-trainsbtc.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
Recent reports of universities offering courses to foundation employees suggest that fairly
rigorous training is becoming available, at least for some segments of the nonprofit
community willing and able to pay for it. See Scott Westcott, Two Universities Start Efforts to
Provide Formal Training to Grant Makers, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 15, 2004, passim.
267 See Swords, supra note 8, at 578-80 (advocating training on nonprofit tax filings).
26 The recent model code of ethics released by Independent Sector evidences a small
step in this direction. Most of its content remains focused on financial accountability
issues, but the importance of mission and governance are highlighted as well. See
Independent Sector, Statement of Values and Code of Ethics for Nonprofit and Philanthropic
Organizations, available at http://www.independent sector.org/members/code-main.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
269 See, e.g., Peggy Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-Profit Boardroom:
Looking Beyond the Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1485, 1533-44
(2003) (describing changes to governance and standing law to empower nonprofit CEOs
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organizational and mission accountability.
Of course, the resources necessary to provide nonprofit training
programs always are limited. But perhaps there are methods available
to counteract this scarcity problem. Investments in training technology
ultimately may make educational efforts more affordable.272  The
government might be persuaded to mandate fiduciaries' attendance at
such training sessions, in a scheme akin to the continuing educationS • 273
requirements imposed by many states on their professionals. Maybe
nonprofits could be convinced to agree to a sliding scale of self-imposed
fees to provide training, as small businesses agree to self-taxation to fund
improved services to a foundering business district.274  Or those
associations of nonprofits that exist to represent the nonprofit sector
might be prevailed upon to prioritize training focused on mission and
organizational accountability, in recognition of their importance to
sector-wide health and their unavailability elsewhere. More planning
and consideration of options then is possible here will be required to
create an effective commitment to self-enforcement of mission and
and other professional staff members to monitor mission).
270 Individual members currently face serious legal, collective action, and other
obstacles in enforcing nonprofit accountability. I have addressed these in detail elsewhere.
See Brakman Reiser, supra note 31, at 859-64. However, when members do exist, they have
advantages in perceiving mission creep, and for some types of nonprofits, training and
empowering members may allow for mission accountability gains. See id. at 844.
" See, e.g., Blasko et al., supra note 55, at 52-78 (describing growing availability of
private standing to enforce duties of charitable entities and fiduciaries); Susan N. Gary,
Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L.
REV. 593, 647-48 (1999) (describing potential use of the public to enforce nonprofit
accountability, in suits as relators).
272 At least one interactive computer program has been created and marketed to guide
nonprofit fiduciaries and employees through decision-making simulations, providing
information on their legal responsibilities and giving them exposure to difficult situations
before they arise in their organizations. See AUTODIDACTIX LLC, AVOIDING TROUBLE WHILE
DOING GOOD: A GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (2004) (CD-ROM available
at http://www.charitygovernance.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2004)). Tools like these can
offer flexible, and perhaps less expensive, training experiences to nonprofit fiduciaries.
27 See, e.g., State Medical Licensure Requirements and Statistics, 2003, Continuing
Medical Education for Licensure Reregistration, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ (last visited
Oct. 11, 2004); Arizona State Board of Accountancy, CPE Requirements, at
http://www.accountancy.state.az.us/cpe.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); Supreme Court of
Ohio, Commission on Continuing Legal Education, Just the Facts - Continuing Legal
Education for Attorneys, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ CCLE/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2004). Online programs may be particularly cost-effective.
274 See, e.g., Central Philadelphia Development Corporation website (describing self-
funded "business improvement district dedicated to keeping the downtown of the nation's
fourth largest metropolitan area clean, safe and attractive"), available at
http://www.centercityphila.org/home/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
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organizational accountability. These preliminary ideas may, however,
spark greater interest in addressing this vital need.
CONCLUSION
The resurgence of interest by state AGs in exercising their oversight
responsibilities in the nonprofit sector certainly should be applauded as
an improvement over decades of relative inactivity. However, AG
enforcement will never uniformly address the range of problems
experienced by nonprofit organizations and the range of missteps by
nonprofit fiduciaries. Their legislative mandates, the skills of their staffs,
and the concerns of voters will lead AGs to focus their enforcement
efforts on lapses of financial accountability.
This financial accountability bias afflicts even activist state AGs. Their
litigation and regulatory efforts focus primarily on donor and asset
protection. New Sarbanes-Oxley-type legislation, advocated by a few
AGs, likewise heavily emphasizes financial issues. If enacted, these
reforms might raise the level of financial transparency in nonprofit
corporations, particularly those engaged in charitable solicitation and
those with considerable assets. But, these reforms will have only minor
impacts on organizational accountability and will do little or nothing to
address the problem of mission creep. This primary, even sole, focus on
financial accountability may be appropriate in the for-profit sector,
where the goal of business organizations is to maximize profits for
investors 275 and the well-being of so many Americans is tied up in the
accurate and efficient portrayal of corporate finances. In the nonprofit
sector, however, enforcement of financial accountability alone is utterly
inadequate.
AGs' focus on the financial accountability of nonprofits, to the
exclusion of mission and organizational accountability, leaves a gap in
the assistance the nonprofit sector needs to play its necessary role in our
society. The search for comprehensive nonprofit accountability,
therefore, cannot end with an appeal to, or applause for, state AG
activism. Rather, it is necessary to consider new mechanisms to
stimulate mission and organizational accountability, including the
potential mechanisms of self-regulation outlined here. To support and
maintain a thriving nonprofit sector, additional enforcement methods
must complement the role of AGs, to compensate for their particular
focus on financial matters. Given the great importance of the nonprofit
275 See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation,
and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1278-80 (1991).
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sector in our economy and our society, a narrow focus on enforcing
financial accountability is not nearly enough.
